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The Israel Lobby and the
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process
Miles Hansen

Abstract
This paper usesjiJreign poli(v analysis theOty to study the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in
the periodfollowing Mahmoud Abbas' election until Hamas' surprising victory in the January
2006 parliamentary elections. It integrates a narrative of the year leading up to Hamas'
victory with an analysis of us. policy toward israel and Palestine, and the influence of the
Israel Lobby-particularly AiPAC. The author argues that the Israel Lobby prevented the us.
./Tom supporting a moderate Palestinian Authority, thereby shijiing Palestinians' support to
extremists and consequently decreasing pro,lpects/or peace. The lack o/support/rom the us.
inhibited the PA~' ability to.!imction as an e.!fective governing power and to provide essential
public goods, e.g., political, social, economic, and security reforms. The Palestinian people,
disenchanted with the weak leadership of Fatah, elected Hamas as a protest against Fatahnot as an endorsement.!or Hamas ' terrorist tactics. The paper concludes that the possibility
for outcomes constructive to the peace process would have been higher ij'the Us. had lent
Abbas its.!iill support.
Introduction
The past eighteen months have been a difficult time in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As
a means of accomplishing its political goals, the Hamas-Ied Palestinian Authority has refused
to accept the existence of Israel and renounce violence against Israeli civilians. Civil strife has
been rampant in the Occupied Territories as Hamas and Fatah vie for political power, resulting
in the effectual split of Palestine into two separate entities-one led by Hamas in the Gaza Strip
and the other led by Fatah in the West Bank. Israel has continued to confiscate land unilaterally
as it works to complete its Separation Barrier, dividing the Occupied Territories even further.
The U.S. has continued its boycott of aid to the Palestinian Authority and Israel refuses to
release millions of dollars of tax revenue collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA)
3
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(Department of State 2007). The lack of these funds has crippled the PA's ability to provide
basic needs to its people, raising the level of human suffering in the Occupied Territories to
new levels.
These unfortunate developments in the conflict followed a period during 2005 when.
according to both Israeli and Palestinian leaders, the prospects for peace were high (Oliver
2005). This paper looks at the Israeli-Palestinian contlict as a struggle driven by missed
opportunities and analyzes the period following moderate Mahmoud Abbas' election as
president of the PA until Hamas' surprising victory in the January 2006 parliamentary
elections. Abbas' willingness to rein in Palestinian militia groups, while actively pursuing a
closer relationship with the West, in concert with the peace process was ~ breath of fresh air
following the tumultuous years of the AI-Aqsa Intifadeh. These developments provided a new
beginning of sorts in the peaee process and a prime opportunity for a lasting peace to be forged
between Israel and Palestine. Despite thc optimistic mood of the time, as thc year continued to
progress, hope turned to disillusionment and compromise to belligerence as leaders neglected
their commitments, failing to capitalize on the opportunity, thcreby opening the door for
Hamas' rise to power and allowing the prospects of peace to stagnate and disappear into
history as yet another missed opportunity.
Attempting to understand what went wrong at this pat1icular juncture will enable
policymakers to adjust future policy to ensure that similar problems are not repeated. The role
of the U.S. has been prominent throughout the conflict. and U.S. policy is grcatly influenced
by domcstic pro-Israel lobbyist groups, particularly the American Israel Political Affairs
Committee (AI PAC). While compiling a narrative of the year leading up to the Hamas victory.
I integrated different analyses of U.S. policy towards Israel and Palestine in an effort to find the
effects of U.S. policy on the shift in political power from Fatah to Hamas. To understand this
relationship better, it is critical to study the influence the Israel Lobby had on U.S. policy. The
evidence suggests that U.S. policy failed to keep its commitments to Abbas. undermining U.S.
support of the PA while Fatah was in control, thereby inhibiting the PA's ability to function
as an effective governing power. Because the PA could not provide essential public goods
such as political, social, economic. and security reforms, it had politically weak leadership.
As a result, the Palestinian people became disenchanted with the failures of Fatah and elected
Hamas as a protest to Fatah. Therefore, Hamas' victory was not an endorsement for Hamas'
terrorist tactics or its refusal to consider peace with Israel. Rather, the group won in spite of
these extremist views, because it was the only other viable alternative to Fatah.

Historical Context
In January 2005, Israel and the PA seemed on the verge of peace. Both sides recognized
the right of the other to exist, and leaders publicly proclaimed a desire to reach a peace
agreement. Mahmoud Abbas successfully negotiated support from Hamas and Islamic Jihad
for a cessation of hostilitics with Israel. Then on 8 February, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
and Abbas negotiated a ccasefire between Israel and Palestine, ending a five-year Intifadeh.
At a meeting in Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt, Sharon declared that "Israel [would] cease all its
military activity against all Palestinians everywhere" (Oliver 2005). Interestingly, President
George Bush had promised Abbas $350 million of direct foreign aid just a week before to help
4
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support the newly elected leader in his efforts to rein in Palestinian militias and to enhance
the governing capability of the PA. Bush also invited Sharon and Abbas to the White House
to build upon this new foundation of peace. Sharon and Bush recognized the opportunity to
reach an agreement with the pragmatic Abbas and therefore directed policy toward supporting
the newly elected leader. Abbas best summarized the positive mood about the prospects for
peace when, referring to Sharm el-Shiek's epithet as the city of peace, he asserted that "a
new opportunity for peace [was1born today in the City of Peace ... let's pledge to protect it"
(Oliver 2005).
Recent history shows that, despite commitment from all three parties to a two-state
solution and a mutual desire for peace, this was yet another lost opportunity in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict tragedy. Over the course of eleven months, the ceasefire and the peace
process slowly unraveled, concluding when Hamas' electoral victory indefinitely derailed the
peace effort.
As long as Hamas remains in power and refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist, Israel
will refuse to negotiate. The conflict between Fatah and Hamas will cripple the PA's ability to
represent all Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, let alone in the international community.
How was the momentum for peace that came out of the City of Peace in February 2005 lost'?
What contributed to Fatah's demise and Hamas' victory in the 2006 elections? What role did
U.S. policy play in this process, and how did the Israel Lobby influence U.S. policy?
Answers to these questions may be found, in part, by analyzing the role the U.S. played in
the conflict and the effects of U.S. policy on political developments within the PA. Illuminating
these effects (and their negative impacts on the peace process) clarifies the benefits if the
U.S. assumes a balanced position between the belligerent parties in the conflict. In order to
understand how this occurs, this paper analyzes the foreign policy formulation process within
the U.S., particularly the strong influence of the Israel Lobby. The effects of this influence did
not coincide with the stated goals of both the U.S. and Israel and, therefore, at least in this
particular instance, the Israel Lobby does not further the interests of either state. In order for
peace to come to Israel and Palestine, it is imperative that the policies of all stakeholders are
designed to accomplish the goals Sharon and Abbas agreed upon in Sharm el-Sheik. These
goals, according to numerous public opinion polls, are supported by a majority of Israelis and
Palestinians as well as the current leadership of Israel, Fatah, and the U.S. These stakeholders
all want peace between Israel and Palestine within the framework of a two-state solution
where two states-:-one Palestinian and the other Israeli-live side by side in peace (Opinion
Leader's Survey 2007).

Theoretical Framework
The conflict between Israel and Palestine is intensely complex with a multiplicity of
actors, influences, causes, and desired outcomes. This paper searches for a degree of clarity
in the confusion by focusing on U.S.-Israeli and U.S.-Palestinian interaction and analyzing
the effects of these relationships on the PA's domestic politics and the impact on the peace
process between Israel and Palestine. In order to understand these relationships, a number
of assumptions must be made regarding how states interact with one another, how states
formulate and implement foreign policy, and how domestic actors within a government vie
5
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for political power. The study of interstate relations is embodied under the wide umbrella of
international relations (lR) theory. Traditionally, IR theory has assumed that the state is a unitary
actor in the international arena, thereby neglecting the formative dynamics of foreign policy
within the state that are critical to the analyses conducted in this paper. Therefore, I will first
establish the theoretical framework that pertains to interstate interaction. Secondly, I will
use foreign policy analysis (FPA) to establish a theoretical basis through which the study of
intrastate foreign policy formulation is conducted. Finally, I will look at the assumptions made
in public choice theory in order to provide the framework to analyze the political struggle
within the PA between Hamas and Fatah.
Within IR theory, there arc various schools of thought through which scholars view and
interpret interaction between states, the most dominant of which is Realism. According to the
Realist tradition, states are unitary actors in an anarchic international system making rational
decisions with the goal of preserving their individual sovereignty (Teti 2002). Therefore, each
state, acting as a unitary entity, is capable offormulating various foreign policy options and then
implementing the option that best enhances the state's power in the international community.
States arc assumed to be unitary actors because each decision-making group within a state is a
rational actor sharing a common goal of self-preservation (Levy 1997). According to rational
choice theory, if an actor is rational, it weighs all options and finds the one that is best as defined
by its preferences and constraints. When faced with decisions, each decision-maker within a
state will rationally analyze the situation and come to the same rational conclusion. Thus, states
are unitary actors when competing in the international arena.
Realism describes the acquisition and loss of power between these primary actors as a
zero-sum scenario that results in a "balance of power" approach to maintaining stability in
the international system (Walz 1979). Kathleen Christison, a former CIA political analyst.
used this basic tenet of Realism to illustrate the downfalls of U.S. policy toward the IsraeliPalestinian conflict (1997). Christison wrote that U.S. policy has continuously favored IsraeL
thereby maintaining an imbalanced distribution of power between Israel and Palestine (1997.
47). According to the Realist tradition, this lack of balance of power perpetuates the conflict
between the two countries.
While Reali,m adequately describes the interactions between states, it has been
criticized for its oversimplification of the international system and neglect of the domestic
foreign policy formulation process (Teti 2002, 10). A pluralistic approach has developed
within the Realist tradition to account for actors other than states in the international arena
(such as intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational
corporations). In the realm of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, pluralism has been used to factor
in the effects of the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and a host of
other organizations that arc actively participating in the conflict.
Pluralism also incorporates more nuanced approaches to rational choice to account for
the non-unitary reality of decision making within a state. Work by economists Eda Karni
and Zvi Safra recounted the growing acknowledgment that rational choice theory does not
accurately account for the vast number of inputs that go into each decision and the variance
among decision-makers' interpretations of these inputs (1987). Recognizing these limitations
of rational choice allows Pluralism to provide a theoretical framework that more accurately
6
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reflects the true nature of foreign policy decision making. Robert Keohane, a professor at
Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs, argued, "The next major step
forward in understanding international cooperation will have to incorporate domestic politics
fully into the analysis-not on a merely ad hoc basis, but systematically" (Waever 1996, 21).
This Pluralistic approach is known as foreign policy analysis.
Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is bas cd on the premise that the ground upon which all IR
theory is built is the formulation of foreign policy (Hudson 2005). This situates FPA as the
intersection of IR theory and public policy, thereby opening it up to influences from a wide
range of disciplines and theories. According to FPA, foreign policy is technically formulated
and implemented by a network of government agencies, but this process is greatly influenced
by a complex web of international organizations, public opinions, personalities, and domestic
organizations. This pluralistic approach of looking at foreign policy "allows us to look into
the 'black box' of the state, allowing us a better understanding of the complex genesis of
foreign policy" (Teti 2002, 10). However, the difficulty of building an efTective theory for
understanding foreign policy formulation cannot be understated when one considers the
seemingly infinite number of actors, influences, motivations, variables, and possible policies
that exist for each policy decision. In a critique of FPA, Ole Waever noted that the difficulty of
integrating domestic and international explanations for foreign policy has led to disappointment
with FPA within the IR discipline (1996, 21).
Despite the limitations of FPA in applying a cohesive theory to both the domestic and
international factors of foreign affairs, no superior theories have been developed to date. FPA
remains the only significant attempt to bridge the interrelated realms of domestic foreign
policy formulation and its implementation in the international system. Hence, FPA's focus
on the domestic factors of foreign policy is the gateway through which I have analyzed the
influence of the Israel Lobby on U.S. foreign policy. The seminal work on this topic, the Israel
Lobby by Walt and Mearsheimer, is an in-depth look at the Israel Lobby and its effects on U.S.
foreign policy (2006). The authors asserted in their opening statements that "the overall thrust
of U.S. policy in the region is duc almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially
to the activities of the Israel Lobby" (2006, 2). Although they did not formulate an explicit
theory, all of their arguments took place within the domestic realm of foreign policy with an
eye toward the impact of policy in the international system. This duality is best viewed and
explored through the lens of FPA.
While looking at the causes of the rise of Hamas within Palestine, this paper posits that
foreign influences 'inadvertently played a significant role in increasing domestic support for
Hamas. Nevertheless, the actual struggle for political power between the two factions is a
domestic issue within the PA. The underlying assumptions of public choice theory serve
as a solid foundation upon which discussion of the internal politics of Palestine may take
place (Scaff and Ingram 1987). Public choice studies the behavior of voters, politicians, and
government officials as (mostly) self-interested agents. Their interactions in the domestic social
system are based on self-interested actions that are determined by personal preferences. These
preferences are defined by individuals or organizations with which an individual associates
(e.g, Hamas and Fatah). Actors within the political process are rational, making choices that
will maximize their satisfaction as defined by their preferences. Political parties rise and fall in
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power as the preferences of constituents change. In a similar manner, political leaders pursue
their preference for maintaininglincreasing political power by making decisions according
to the preferences of their sources of power-political parties they belong to, constituents
they represent, and the government in which thcy work. Rubin (200(i), Malki (200(i), and
Sharnasky (200(i) all uscd assumptions grounded in public choice theory as they analyzed the
reasons for Hamas' rise to power.
This paper looks at the interplay of three actors on the international stage. Even in this
relatively simple case study, the complex reality of international relations requires a number of
interrelated yet different theoretical frameworks, each of which accounts for a unique sphere
in which these actors operate. The patchwork of multiple theories that is required in this study
limits the generalizations that may be drawn from its conclusions. This weakness illustrates
that no adequate theory currently exists that is capable of accurately framing the causes and
effects of foreign policy formulation and implementation. Further work towards constructing
such a theory will continue to clarify the complex relationship between domestic factions and
foreign policy implications.

Methodology
I conducted a content analysis through archival research, looking at the shift in power
from Fatah to Hamas that occurred over a twelve-month period and led to Hamas' victory in
the January 2006 parliamentary elections. This content analysis was done using a database of
day-by-day newswires coming out of the Occupied Territories. This database, the Monthly
Media Monitoring Review (MMR), was collectcd by the Division on Palestinian Rights
(DPR), a subsidiary of the United Nations Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People (CEIRPP). I identified events, quotes, and actions that may have influenced
or indicated the changing political tide. I also studied previous research that identified weak
leadership, corruption, and an inability to satisfy public needs as chief causes of Fatah's
political demise. While compiling a narrative of the year leading up to the decisive elections,
I integrated analyses of U.S. policy towards Israel and Palestine, including the role the Israel
Lobby played in influencing that policy, in an effort to find the effects of U.S. policy on the
shift in political power between Hamas and Fatah. The evidence suggested that the U.S. did
not substantially support the PA as it had committed, which contributed to the PA's inability to
function as an effective governing power and provide essential public goods. As a result, the
Palestinian people shifted their support to the only available alternative-Hamas.
The Israel Lobby and U.S. "Policy Schizophrenia"
A vital finding of this paper was that a key determinate of U.S. foreign policy is the
influence of pro-Israel Lobby groups within the United States. While there arc a significant
number of organizations that share a mutual goal of promoting a pro-Israel agenda within the
U.S., as stated previously, the most influential group is AIPAC (Lerner 2007).
The link between Israel and AIPAC has been identified by both former Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon and current Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. To a U.S. audience, Sharon said,
"When people ask me how they can help Israel, I tell them-hclp AIPAC." Olmert
concurred, "Thank God we have AIPAC, the greatest supporter and friend we have in the
8
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whole world." Commenting on the power AIPAC wields in Congress, former Senator Ernest
Hollings (D-SC) noted that "'you can't have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives
you" (Mearsheimer 2006, 31 ).
Building arguments on an FPA theoretical framework, Walt and Mearsheimer detailed the
effects ofthe Israel Lobby on U.S. policy toward Israel and Palestine, writing, "Washington has
given Israel wide latitude in dealing with the Occupied Territories, even when its actions were
at odds with stated U.S. policy" (Mearsheimer 2006, 31). One third of all foreign aid leaving
the U.S. makes its way to Israel, the sixteenth richest nation in the world (Zunes 2007). Israel
receives an average of $3 billion in U.S. forcign aid annually, with an exclusive exemption
from U.S. oversight on how the money is allocated. According to Walt and Mearsheimer,
this exemption "makes it virtually impossible to prevent the money from being used for
purposes that the U.S. opposes, like building settlements in the West Bank" (2006, 31). They
concluded that "'were it not for the lobby's ability to work efTectively within the American
political system, the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less
intimate than it is today" (2006, 39).
Dumke effectively opened the proverbial black box of policy formulation by exposing
how the Israel Lobby influences Congress. He reported that the Israel Lobby donates more
money than any other foreign-oriented lobby to local, state, and federal elections ($42.3
million from 19R2-2002 compared to $297,000 by pro-Arab groups during the same time
period). He also cited a number of examples to show how the Israel Lobby politically punishes
those who do not comply with its policy positions (Dumke 2006, 8). Uri Avnery, a prominent
Israeli peace activist, noted, "Every few years the Jewish lobby 'eliminates' an American
politician who does not support the Israeli government unconditionally. This is not done
secretly, behind closed doors, but as a public 'execution'" (Dumke 2006, 9). The onslaught of
anti-Semitic accusations that were flung at Jimmy Carter following the publication of his book
Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid is an excellent example of a political "execution" to which
Avnery referred (Elliot 2007).
The power of the Israel Lobby is impressive but, in and of itself, it is not illegal or even
unethical in terms of contemporary lobbying practices. AIPAC and other pro-Israel organizations
play by the same rules as other interest groups; the greatest difTerence is simply that the Israel
Lobby does it much better. Nevertheless, if the Israel Lobby supports Israel, as Sharon and
Olmert declared, then the policies it seeks to implement should work to further Israeli efforts to
achieve a lasting pe~ce with Palestine in the context ofa two-state solution, which are objectives
supported by Israel's most recent prime ministers (Elliot 2007).

Losing an Opportunity
As previously noted, a great deal of optimism surrounded Abbas' election and the
cease fire agreed to in the February 2005 Sharm el-Sheik meeting. It appeared as though Abbas
had the trust of Sharon and the support of the U.S. as long as he continued to implement
needed political and security reforms. Armed with pledges for financial aid from the U.S.
and a willingness to negotiate from Israel, Abbas returned from Sharm el-Sheik prepared
to rein in Palestinian militias and respectfUlly work with Israel~two endeavors that would
require risking his political power domestically, particularly among Palestinians wary of the
9
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U.S. and Israel. An analysis of the months that followed showed that Abbas made significant
efforts to maintain the Palestinian side of the eeasefire and to bridle Palestinian militias, all
pursuant to U.S. foreign aid requirements. However, U.S. policy, with its customary influence
from AIPAC, undermined the Palestinian president's efforts. Without U.S. support, the peace
process and Abbas' political power began to unravel, evidenced by the disintegration of the
ceasefire and the shift in public support from Abbas' paliy, Fatah, to Hamas, as was manifested
in the January 2006 elections.
The optimistic mood that existed following Sharm el-Sheik in February 2005 did not
last long. On 25 February, a suicide bomber blew himself up at the Stage nightclub in Tel
Aviv. The blast killed five Israeli youth and injured approximately fitly "more. Immediately,
Abbas denounced the attack as an attempt to sabotage the peace process and Israel just as
quickly began to express doubts that Abbas could "tighten the screws" on militant groups
within the Occupied Territories (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). After
recommitting Palestinian militias to cease attacks against Israel, Abbas made significant efforts
to combat Palestinian militants. The UN Division for Palestinian Rights (2005) reported the
following steps that Abbas took:
• Deployed a six hundred-man Palestinian security force with the mission to stop all
attacks by Palestinian militants against Israel.
• Replaced security commanders who failed to stop attacks against Israel from
originating in their respective areas.
• Denounced Hezbollah's connection with Palestinian militants and dispatching senior
PA officials to urge Hezbollah leaders to cease aiding Palestinian militias.
• Searched out and destroyed illegal arms caches and smuggling tunnels.
• Arrested Palestinians from all factions, including Fatah, suspected in collaborating
with Palestinian militants.
• Persuaded Hamas to abide by the tcrms ofthc ccasefire and participate in parliamentary
elections, thereby entering the political process for the first time.
• Held a conference in Cairo with representatives of thirteen Palestinian factions in an
attempt to bring a stronger sense of unity among the various groups and to agree to
changes in the Palestinian parliamentary election process in order to make the political
process more pluralistic.
• Implemented widespread institutional refonns and reorganized PA security and police
forces in order to bolster the PA's monopoly on violence in the Occupied Territories .
• Forced the retirement of over I, I 00 security otlicials who did not agree with PA efforts
to fight Palestinians in order to halt violence against Israel.
• Formed technical committees comprised of forty-two Palestinian experts in "politics,
security, planning, media, environment, and economics" in order to coordinate the
planned Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.
• Threatened to usc "an iron fist" against anyone who violated the ceasefire with Israel.
• Issued a decree banning civilians from carrying unlicensed weapons and then enforced
the decree with arrests and fines.
• Demolished homes of Palestinian officials who had illegally obtained building material
and property with public funds.
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Abbas' aggressive efforts to enforce PA authority throughout the Occupied Territories
prompted Aharon Zeevi, Israel's Military Intelligence chief general, to recognize that "there is
determined action on [Abbas'] part in terms of his aims and intentions. [Mr. Abbas] has changed
the people in his office, has limited incitement, and made changes in the legal sphere. He is
succeeding to maintain the calm ... "(United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005).
Ironically, on the same day that Zeevi articulated Israeli acknowledgment of Abbas'
efforts, the U.S. Senate approved House Resolution 1268, an emergency spending bill that
dramatically undercut the PA. Leading up to the bill, Bush had asked his fellow Republicans
in Congress to approve the foreign aid package he promised Abbas during the State of the
Union Address. In the speech before Congress, Bush had promised Abbas $350 million if
the Palestinian president continued to rein in militant groups within Palestine and worked
towards developing a lasting peace with Israel-requirements that, according to Israel's senior
intelligence official, Abbas had met. The money was to be used "to support Palestinian political,
economic, social, and sccurity reforms" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005).
This pledge was repeatedly confirmed by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice throughout the
spring of 2005. Congress responded to these U.S. commitments and Abbas' efforts by passing
a measure that forbade direct assistance to the PA, even denying President Bush the customary
right to waive restrictions in the interest of national security. The foreign aid package did so
in an amazing display of bipartisanship with a 388-44 margin in the House and sailed through
the Senate with equal force. The resulting aid deal was a far cry from the pledge Bush made
to Abbas. The bill called for a trimmed offer of $200 million to be given to nongovernmental
projects expressly outside the control of the PA. Interestingly, $50 million of the $200 million
was allocated to the Israeli government to invest in more rigorous checkpoints throughout
the Occupied Territories, thereby strengthening Israeli control over lands considered by the
international community as being illegally occupied Palestinian territory per Articles 33, 53,
and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Security Council Resolution 242. In a measure
dubbed as "Palestinian Healthcare," the bill allocated $2 million to Hadassah, the Women's
Zionist Organization of America (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005).
The effects of the congressional action were a "huge slap in the face" and a "startling
setback to Abbas" according to Edward Abington Jr., a Washington-based PA consultant (Kessler
2005). Danny Ayalon, Israeli ambassador to the U.S., responded in support of the restrictions,
saying that Abbas had been "very disappointing" due to his failure to confront Palestinian
militant groups, a position that, as previously shown, was not supported by the facts or senior
officials in Israel's 'intelligence corps (Kessler 2005). AIPAC was directly involved in the
package's negotiations, playing its typical role as a lobbying group and conducting research for
congressional representatives and senators (McArthur 2005). While it was difficult to investigate
specific actions taken by AIPAC during the private negotiations surrounding HR 1268, it was
telling to note that among the strongest advocates of stringent restrictions on aid to Abbas and
the PA were Representative Tom Delay, House Majority Leader; Representative Nita Lowey, a
member ofthe Appropriations Committee; and Representatives Tom Lantos and Shelley Berkley,
of the International Relations Committee (McArthur 2005). In 2004, these four representatives
were reported among the top ten recipients of pro-Israel PAC funds, netting a combined $499,493
over their careers (Galford 2004).
11
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The Bush Administration had assured Abbas that U.S. aid would be sent to strengthen
the PA, but the powerful Israel Lobby converted the policy so that in the end the PA was
adversely affected. Not only did the lack of expected funds weaken the PA, but the rebuff
from Washington also eroded public support among Palestinians for leaders who had justified
cracking down on fellow Palestinians with promises for sorely needed political support and
economic/humanitarian aid from the U.S.
Despite this significant setback, throughout May and June, Abbas continued his rhetoric
against militant factions within the Occupied Territories, although with diminishing ability to
maintain stability. From this period forward, Abbas' ability to maintain his political/security
reforms and the eeasefire with Israel began to deteriorate at an increasingly rapid pace. On
21 June, Abbas and Sharon met for two hours in Sharon's official residence in Jerusalem.
Comments following the meeting indicated a significant change in tone from both leaders.
Following the meeting, Abbas and Sharon did not meet together as planned in a joint press
conference, and Abbas refused to address journalists as he had scheduled, instead sending
PA Prime Minister Qureia to meet with members of the media. Qureia reported, 'This was a
difficult meeting, and did not live up to our expectations. In all the basic issues for which we
were expecting positive responses, there were none" (United Nations Division for Palestinian
Rights 2005). The events and comments that followed the meeting were strong indicators of
the pessimism that existed within the PA and the changing tide in the peace process.
In July, with the unilateral withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip fast approaching,
the circumstances on the ground continued to grow more complicated for Abbas and the PA.
Sensing weakness, and in response to Israel's announcement of the final route of the Separation
Barrier through East Jerusalem, a route that would cut off 55,000 Palestinians from the rest of
the city, Islamic Jihad successfully carried out two suicide attacks on 12 July. Fortunately, no
one other than the militants involved in the bombings was injured, and PA leaders denounced
the bombings as attacks against the peace process (United Nations Division for Palestinian
Rights 2005). Regarding the Separation Barrier, Abbas expressed growing frustration over
the failures in the peace process. He said, "The [East Jerusalem wall] plan is totally rejected. I
don't believe that carrying out such measures by the Israeli Government would bring peace or
security, instead it puts obstacles on the road to peace" (United Nations Division for Palestinian
Rights 2005). PA Prime Minister Qureia added to Abbas' complaint, calling the plan "theft in
broad daylight," and stated, "This decision makes a farce of any talk about peace and turns
the Gaza withdrawal into a useless initiative" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights
2005). Saeb Erakat, ChicfNegotiator for the PA, said that Israel's unilateral decision to build
the wall on Palestinian territory was "determining the fate of 1crusalem before we begin
negotiations" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). The unilateral nature
of Israel's actions in building the Separation Barrier and its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip
without working to ensure a smooth transition had great effects on Abbas' political power.
After reviewing the events that followed the failure of the U.S. to fulfill its commitment
to Abbas and the PA, the stark difference in Abbas' ability to control the various Palestinian
factions before and after House Bill 1268 and the overall mood of the peace process cannot
be emphasized enough. Washington's lack of support, both financial and rhetorical, for the
Palestinian cause significantly undermined Abbas, who had consistently worked to meet
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the requirements set by the U.S. to receive badly needed economic support, support that
unfortunately did not come.
August 2005 is remembered most for the unilateral withdrawal of all Israeli settlers from
the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the West Bank. This move was discussed by
Sharon and Abbas in Sharm el-Sheik as an opportunity for the PA to have territory exclusively
its own to govern. While the pullout occurred, Israel only allowed one gateway between
Gaza and the outside world, placing extreme pressure on the PA's ability to effectively build
an economy and govern the area. On 23 August, just eight days after the well publicized
withdrawal from Gaza, Prime Minister Sharon initiated the largest West Bank settlement
expansion yet, confiscating an area larger than the Gaza Strip between East Jerusalem and
the Ma 'ale Adumim settlement. After the completion of the expansion, there would only be
thirteen kilometers between the newly confiscated land and the Jordanian border, leaving the
West Bank nearly divided into northern and southern halves. Regarding the expansion, PA
Chief Negotiator Saeb Erakat said, "Such decisions will only serve to undermine any efforts
to resume negotiations," adding, "This will destroy President Bush's vision of a two-state
solution'" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). President Bush was silent
on the issue, opting instead to continue to praise Israel for its withdrawal from Gaza and put
pressure on the PA to halt all attacks coming out of the Occupied Territories (United Nations
Division for Palestinian Rights 2005).
The last four months of Fatah's control of the PA were marred by increasing hostilities
between Israel and Palestine. From 15~17 October, Israeli Defense Forces arrested hundreds of
Palestinians. Abbas objected to the arrests but did not have the power to translate his objections
into any concessions by Israel, and the U.S. took no action to pressure Israel to abide by the
terms of the peace agreement. Israeli raids on Palestinian leaders began to increase through
November and December, and Palestinian militias stepped up rocket and mortar attacks on
Israeli outposts during the same period (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005).
Just a few months after Sharon and Abbas shook hands in Sharm el-Sheik, the fragile peace
they brokered was all but lost.

The Fall of Fatah and the Rise of Hamas
On 25 January 2006, the political landscape within the PA changed abruptly. In a surprising
victory, Hamas won 74 of 132 seats on the Palestinian Legislative Council, allowing it to form
the PA government on its own (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). In order
to distance itself from the radical image of Hamas, members of Fatah boycotted the new
government, refusing any positions within it. Acting Prime Minister Olmert announced that
Israel would not hold any negotiations with a government comprised of members of Hamas,
and the U.S. led a boycott of Western aid to the Hamas-led PA. In the days leading to the
election, Hamas made it clear that if elected into power, it did not intend to accept peace
with Israel or renounce violence as a means to accomplish its political goals (United Nations
Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). This put an indefinite stop to the peace process and
led to increased violence between Israel and Palestine as well as between Hamas and Fatah
factions within Palestine. The effects of the increased isolation of the PA within both Gaza and
the West Bank and the freeze placed on foreign aid and Palestinian tax revenues were felt by
13

SIGMA
Palestinians throughout the Occupied Territories. The prospects for peace that had existed one
year before were lost, and the consequences included an incrcase in the number of lives lost
and a decrease in the living conditions in thc West Bank. This tragedy entered a new stage with
a dim prospect for peace.
There is consensus as to why Fatah lost power in the period preceding the election. Barry
Rubin cited weak leadership as the chicf cause of Fatah's demisc. Rubin saw thc situation
through a public choice lens by viewing the PA's ability to mect the nceds of its people
(accommodate the preferences of its constituents) as thc measure of its strength (2006).
Since the PA was unable to provide adequate health care, education, and security for its people,
the leadership is categorized as weak. Riad Malki, director of the Palesti'nian Center for the
Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development, agreed with Rubin that the fall
of Fatah may be attributed to the lack of progress it achieved in the Occupied Territories.
He argued that insecurities stemming from the stalled peace efforts and the failed political
initiatives of Palestinian leaders weakened Fatah. Abbas did not have the ability to translate
his consistent optimism with real results in the lives of Palestinians (Malki 2006). Economic
progress was also elusive for the PA. In the weeks leading up to the election, the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said, "The number of
Palestinians living in poverty had risen to 64 percent from 55 percent last year. Half of those
living in poverty, or 1.2 million Palestinians, lived on less than $1.60 a day, 60 cents below the
poverty line" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005).
This brief review ofliterature on the subject shows that Abbas' PA failed to deliver needed
social, political, security, and economic refonns. As would be expected with a public choice
perspective, the Palestinian electorate shifted its support away from Fatah. It is interesting to
note that the aid package Bush committed to Abbas' Fatah-Ied PA was intended to support
these very facets of the PA's capacity to govern. When Bush initially proposed the direct aid
to Abbas in his 2005 State of the Union Address, he cited the need to "promote [Palestinian 1
democracy" through "supporting Palestinian political, economic, and security reforms" (Bush
2005). This support never came, but the very aspects of society that the Bush administration
identified as critical to an effective PA were indeed the key issues that spurred the shift in
public support away from Fatah to Hamas.
It is unreasonable to assume that had the U.S. made good on its pledged financial
assistance, Abbas would have brought about monumental improvements in the lives of
average Palestinians in the six months leading up to the parliamentary elections. However, as
previously noted, in the first five months of his presidency and in accordance with the Sharm
el Sheik agreements, Abbas focused his efforts on reining in militant groups through security
reform and in persuading Hamas and other Palestinian factions to participate, for the first time,
in the political process. Abbas invested heavily in these security reforms with the assurance
from the U.S. that ifprogress was made, outside support from the U.S. would come to fund the
economic and political reforms that were critical to Abbas' domestic support. While Abbas'
progress was tenuous, steps in the right direction were made, and it is reasonable to conclude
that the promised support from the U.S. would have strengthened Abbas' political power and
enabled him to begin the economic reforms that would most benefit average Palestinians,
thereby garnering the necessary support to win the 2006 parliamentary elections.
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Conclusion
What would have happened if the U.S. had upheld its commitments to Abbas and
provided his government with $350 million in direct aid? What policy would the U.S. have
pursued if the Israel Lobby did not have as much influence on the U.S. legislative branch,
and what alternative outcomes would have been possible if the policies pursued by AIPAC
served to further the development of a two-state solution instead of undermining the growth of
moderate clements within the PA'] Definitive answers to these questions may not be possible,
but after reviewing the events leading to the disintegration of this round of the peace process,
I conclude that the possibility for alternative outcomes, outcomes constructive to the peace
process, would have been higher if the U.S. had lent Abbas its full support.
The months leading up to the 2006 elections and the Hamas victory show that if the
PA is unable to provide for its people, then, given the opportunity, the people will register
their discontent by voting for change. Polls immediately following Hamas' victory show that,
despite a majority of Palestinians voting for Hamas, 75 percent of Palestinians supported a
negotiated peace with Israel, a position that is an anathema to Hamas' ideological foundations
(Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 2006). This shows that when the Israel
Lobby stopped the U.S. from supporting a moderate PA, public support shifted from ruling
moderates to the opposition that, in the Palestinian case, is comprised of extremists who vow
to defend their cause at all costs. These developments, for obvious reasons, are detrimental to
Israel, the U.S., and all those who desire peace, and are an excellent example of what happens
when the U.S. superficially supports the PA while concurrently maintaining a staunch proIsraeli policy, consequently worsening the situation.
As future opportunities for peace arise, it is critical that the U.S. recognize these inherent
flaws in past peace efforts. Given widespread commitment for a two-state solution, it is
imperative to the peace process that all stakeholders committed to peace work to build a viable
Palestinian state. Thus, all parties supporting a two-state solution, including Israel, the PA, and
the U.S., should work together to implement necessary policy refonns to ensure cooperative
support of moderate Palestinians. Only when positive rhetoric is backed with real, productive
action will progress be made in this seemingly never-ending tragedy. Peace can come, and hope
should exist, so long as policymakers courageously hold themselves and others accountable
for fulfilling commitments and pursuing a course consistent with a two-state solution.
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Split-Ticket Voting and
Voter Choice in Utah
Brad Jones and Veronica Walters

Abstract
American democracy is driven by individual voters casting ballots in federal and local
elections. Although this simple action is critical to the functioning of our democracy. it is
little understood. in this paper, we test several theories of voter choice. We look specifically
at the decision of whether or not to cast a split ballot by using a pooled dataset derived from
twenty-four years of exit polling conducted by Brigham Young University s Center for the
Study of Elections and Democracy. Using a multinomial logit model. we .find evidence that
non-political factors-such as a candidate s gender or religion-have a significant impact
on individual vote choice. We also find evidence supporting the claim that individuals might
pursue a poliLy-halancing approach when deciding which candidates to support. Our findings
cast some light on a vexingly opaque issue and suggest the need for further study.
Introduction
How individuals fonnulate their voting decision is of central importance to political
science. In the news coverage that surfaces during every election, the media gravitates
toward the easy explanations. These explanations vary from identity-centric explanations
that inevitably lead to questioning whether the U.S. is ready to elect any of a number of
demographic types, to explanations that oversimplify the advantages of incumbency and name
recognition, and the popular media often gets it wrong. For all of the attention it receives, the
process by which individuals make their vote choice remains largely opaque. In this paper, we
focus on one aspect of the voting process: the decision to cast a split ticket.
Political scientists are becoming increasingly interested in answering the question of why
the U.S. is becoming more politically divided. Split-ticket voting and elections in the state of
Utah are especially intriguing. Candidates who identify with the Democratic Party are at a
disadvantage in this predominately Republican state. In 2004, George W. Bush took 67 percent
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of the vote in Utah's Second District, but many of those same voters elected Congressman Jim
Matheson, a moderate Democrat. This election and a number of others in Utah's congressional
districts provide interesting examples of the split-ticket voting phenomenon. Using data from
the Utah Colleges Exit Poll results from 1982 through 2006, we tested the theories of splitticket voting and synthesized them into a model for understanding causes of split-ticket voting
in Utah.
Utah presents a unique casc for studying the practice of split-ticket voting and theories of
divided government. As a predominately Republican state, there is relatively little uncertainty
in Utah presidential elections. Its homogenous, predominately white, Latter-day Saint (LDS),
and conservative population has some effect on which candidates decide to enter races.
For example, a Democratic candidate from Utah might be to the right of some Republican
candidate from another state.

Theoretical Framework
The existing research on divided government and split-ticket voting may be broadly
categorized by voter motives and structural or individual levcl influences. The major theories
fall into one of four categories included in our theoretical framework, depicted in Table I. Each
category provides a competing explanation for an electorate's decision to split his or her ticket.
TABLE I

Accidental

_ _I--_ _ _ _ lntentio_n_a_I_ __

Structural

Systemic

Cognitive
Madisonianism

Individual

Personal Vote

Policy
Balancers

The Accidental/Structural explanation suggests that a person's vote choice is most influenced
by system-level factors. As such, divided government may be the result of characteristics
inherent to the electoral competition. For example, the incumbency advantage, straight-party
voting, and the difference between midterm and presidential electorates have all been credited
for influencing split-ticket voting. The momentum created by incumbency is especially relevant
in congressional elections where the "financial advantages that most incumbents possess drives
voters toward split ballots" (Burden and Kimball 1998). Straight-party voting is currently an
option on ballots in seventeen states, including Utah. A study done by Campbell ef af. in 1960
found split-ticket voting to be 8 percent higher in states that did not offer the straight-ticket
option, leading us to believe that ballots with a straight-party choice dccrease split tickets. Finally,
the difference between midterm and presidential electorates could have some effect on voting
decision. These differences include lower midterm turnout and differcnces in age, education, and
income between thc two electorates (Mcintosh et al. 1981).
The Accidental/Individual explanation suggests that an individual votes for the best
candidate. This is a straightforward statement, but whcn compared to the rest of our theoretical
framework, the importance of this statement becomes apparent. Based on this theory, voters
do not intentionally vote a split ticket, nor do they necessarily vote a split ticket based on the
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structural influences above. The voter considers each election on its own merits and selects the
candidate they judge to be best qualified, taking into account the candidate's gender, religion, and
political experience (Kimball 1997). As a result, a voter who chooses the Republican presidential
candidate may vote for the Democratic house candidate if the alternative they are offered is of
poor quality (Burden and Kimball 2002). This was evident in the 1992 elections in Utah's third
district where the electorate voted for Bush, but also elected the Democratic House candidate
Bill Orton. Following the candidate quality theory, third district voters split their tickets when
presented with a weak, last-minute Republican candidate. The Accidental/Individual explanation
notes the increasing importance of this personal vote and the weakening of parties. Weakening
party attachments are credited for increasing the occurrence of split-ticket voting and an increased
focus on the aforementioned candidate quality (Beck et al. 1992).
The Intentional!Structural argument holds that an individual votes with the intention of
creating a divided government. Split-ticket voters want to create a balance of party control
between the executive and legislative branches, and so we refer to them as Madisonian voters
(Fiorina 1992, 1996). In contrast to the Accidental explanations, voters in the Intentional!
Structural model consider elections in the national context. For an individual to make a splitticket vote choice that would have bearing on creating a divided government, we must assume
that the voter has a good idea of which party will control which branch. In Utah, where the
electorate will decidedly vote for the Republican presidential candidate, a voter would be
likely to vote split ticket if he or she were informed about the likelihood that the vote for the
Democratic representative could create or continue Democratic control of the House.
Finally, the Intentional!Individual model contends that individuals with moderate
political views are motivated to vote split ticket because they hope to achieve centrist policy.
These individuals would vote split ticket for "ideological reasons that have nothing to do
with a desire for divided government" (Burden and Kimball 2002). In order to create this
policy balance, the theory assumes that voters are informed on candidates' policy positions
and that the individual practices expressive or calculated balancing. Expressive balancing
occurs when individuals vote for the candidates they want, regardless of the probability that
their candidates will be elected. Calculated balancing means the individual has weighed the
likelihood of his or her vote bcing significant in creating a policy balance and makes his
or her candidate choices accordingly. In this model, ticket splitting is more likely when the
candidates are polarized (Fiorina 1996). When faced with two extreme candidates, moderate
voters respond to the wider range of policy choices by splitting their ticket in an attempt to
balance the two extr-emes.

Data and Methods
Our data was taken from the 1982-2006 Utah Colleges Exit Polls (UCEP). The period
of our study encompasses the birth of the UCEP through its most recent general election
iteration. This provided a wealth of data (n = 60,000 +) but also presented some unique
challenges. As a student-run poll, the UCEP has evolved over its twenty-five-year lifespan
(older now than most of the students who actually conduct the polling) and established itself
as a credible source of understanding the motivations of the Utah voter. This evolutionary
process presented a challenge to cross-sectional analysis. Undoubtedly, the way student
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interviewers conducted the survey has changed from that first experiment in November
1982 to the fully institutionalized methods used in recent years. Among the problems we
encountered in pooling the information from the extant UCEP data, the most serious were
the differences in question wordings across the years. The most serious of these problems
was that the questions involving income included different income categories as possible
answers in different years. Laying aside the questions of inflation and the changing meaning
of income categories, the exit poll has compromised the results further by employing several
different schemes for measuring respondent income involving different groupings and
numbers of categories in different years. To correct for these differences, we standardized l
income for each year. In doing this, we lost some of the substance in the 'data but controlled
for differences between voters of different socio-economic status. The appendix contains a
detailed overview of the data to include question wordings.
Lacking specialized questions designed to tease out our specific answers across the period
of our study, we relied on some imperfect proxy measures. We have classified theories of
divided governmcnt and split-ticket voting into four broad categories (mentioned earlier), and
we devised tests that measure to what extent Utah voters can be classified under each category.
However, tests of the Structural! Accidental theories of divided government arc outside of the
scope of this paper. Although Utah provides the straight-ticket option,2 we do not have data
on other states to compare or apply results to. For example, we cannot test the effect of other
potential meta-structural reasons for split-ticket voting.
To test Structural!lntentional motives, we collected data on the composition of the
House of Representatives going into each election. Combining this data with information
on which party controlled the presidency allowed us to test whether or not individual
voters take the national context into consideration when deciding whether to cast a split
ticket. Of course, this assumes that the voter was aware of the makeup of Congress, which
may be a rather strong assumption. Alternatively, one could imagine that elites were more
involved in local races during elections when it appears control of the Congress was in
question. However, lacking more information about the knowledge of the typical voter,
we will assume the latter. If our variables measuring the national context at the time of the
election are statistically and substantively significant predictors of whether or not people
decide to cast a split-ticket ballot, our model will have provided evidence for the Structural/
Intentional theories.
In order to test the Individual/Intentional theories of government, we collected data
measuring the issue positions of incumbent representatives. Using standardized and lagged
OW-NOMINATE scores 3 from each year of our study, we created a measure of how much
the Utah congressmen and -women have moved in comparison with the rest of the nation and
where they are ideologically. By design, the OW-NOMINATE score will equal I or -I, for
Republicans or Democrats respectively, for a legislator in the mainstream of his or her party. The
larger the number, the more conservative the legislator, and converscly, a lower score indicates
a more liberal representative. The lagged values were used to calculate a difference score.
Positive differences indicate a representative who moved more to the right; negative scores show
legislators who moved to the left. Using this data, we tested whether or not an individual makes
the decision to cast a split ticket as the ideological position of his or her representative changes.
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Again, use of this measure relies on the assumption that the individual voter was aware of the
changing positions of the representative.
The final tests we ran related to the Individual! Accidental theories of divided government.
To test for the presence or absence of Individual! Accidental motives, we collected data on
each of the candidates for the twenty-four years of the study. Specifically, we were interested
in religion (an especially pertinent issue in Utah), gender, and candidate quality.4 Data was
collected from newspaper stories, the National Journal s biennial political almanac, and, where
possible, interviews with the candidates. To fill in some of the missing data, we contacted
Wayne Holland, Party Chair of the Utah Democratic Party. By using this infonnation, we
tested for some other-than-partisan reasons for vote choice.
We structured our regression as a multinomiallogit 5 regression. Multinomiallogit tests
the probability of a qualitative outcome (in our case, vote choice) against the probability of
some arbitrarily assigned baseline category. Our baseline was casting a straight Republican
ticket, by far the most common choice for Utah voters. In order to make the most of our data,
we simulated the presidential vote for midtenn elections 6 and used all twenty-four years of
exit poll data. We were interested only in votes for the two major parties, and in consequence
our dependent variable can assume four values: straight Republican; straight Democrat; split,
Republican president/Democratic representative; split, Democratic president/Republican
representative. Table 2 shows the variables included in the model (for more detailed summary
statistics, see the appcndix).
TABLE 2
Dependent:
Independent:

Variables
Vote Choice
Voter Demographics: Party !D, Ideology, Party lD/ldeology Interaction,
Religion, Education, Race, Gender, Income
Candidate Demographics: Quality, Gender, Religion
Congressional Race Dynamics: Money Parity, Primary Contests, Previous
Presidential Support, Margin of the Last Election
National Context: Party that Controls the Presidency, Party that Controls the
House, Seat Margin in the House

~---

-----------

----

We structured our tests around these variables, necessarily simplifying many of the
complex issues that must be addressed in a study of vote choice. We used Gary King's
CLARIFy7 program to present our results.

Structural/Intentional Voting
The Structural!Intentional voter, described by Fiorina and others, makes the vote choice
by weighing party choices at the local level against the national context. The argument suggests
that certain individuals prefer divided government and vote with that aim in mind. To test for
the presence of Structural/Intentional voters in the Utah context, we included the national
context variables listed in Table 2. If these variables show the correct signs and are statistically
significant, we have evidence that voters made a strategic calculation in their vote decision.
Particularly, we expected that voters would be more likely to split their ticket when one or both
21

SIGMA
of two conditions exist: I) Congress and the Presidency are controlled by the same party, or 2)
the margin of House scats is slim enough to make it likely that control could switch.
Using the CLARIFY program, we tested the Structural/Intentional hypothesis by
examining the effects on the probability of voting a straight or split ticket. Our median
voter was a white male, independent-leaning Republican who described his political
views as conservative. He is an active member of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, a college graduate, and his household income is above the mean. His district
has the characteristics of the second district in 199R; that is to say, he is represented by a
two-year incumbent, male, moderate, LDS Republican, challenged by a female non-LDS
candidate who has never held electivc office before. His representative narrowly won his
seat in the last election. Therc is a Democrat in the White House, and Congress is held
narrowly by Republicans (sixteen scat margin). Table 3 shows the probability of voting a
split ticket, and how those probabilities change when the values of the variables change.
In this and subsequent tables, we only present the probabilities of voting for a straight
Republican (RR) ticket and a Republican presidential candidate with a Democrat in the
House of Representatives (RD).x
The first column in this and the following tables contains the values for the baseline voter
as described above. The other columns show the predicted probabilities for voters with different
demographic characteristics. For example, Table 3 shows the baseline voter is predicted to have
an 85 percent probability of voting a straight Republican ticket. A pure independent with the
same values of the other variables has a 59 percent probability of voting a straight Republican
ticket. Changing the president to a Republican changes the probabilities as shown.
TABLE 3

~~~~~-~

Intentional/Structural

---------=---=-------=--:--=-::--------------Baseline Voter

Pure Independent

Ind._L~b~r~~Demo_c_ra_t_

----------'-----~
RR
85(1)
59(2)
RD

13 (I)

11(l)

22 (2)

I
I
I,

9 (I)

Republican President; Small R. Majority (+16)
RR
RD

86 (2)
14 (2)

69 (4)

32 (4)

2X (4)

30 (4)

Republican President; Larger R. Majority (+31)
RR
RD

84(2)
16(2)

66(4)

29 (4)

30(4)

31 (4)

~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~----~-

....

------~

Standard errors in parentheses

Structural/Intentional theories depend on an instrumentally rational voter who has
the specific goal in mind of balancing power between the two branches. The individual
voter sees the opportunity to institute a Madisonian balance when the margin of scats in the
House held by one party is small. This would require the voter to know which party controls
the House and by how many seats, but presumably if this is the goal, the voter will have
acquired the necessary information prior to casting a ballot. The model did not give much
support for the Intentional/Structural hypothesis. Although RD split-ticket voting increased
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in the expected direction for the baseline voter, the increase was not statistically significant
when we accounted for the increasing standard error.
IndividuallIntentional
Although similar to the Structurallintentional school, Individuallintentionalists
contend that voters split their tickets out of a different motivation. The instrumental
assumption of the Structural theory is relaxed, and we can imagine voters who split their
tickets out of an affective reasoning. Perhaps individuals vote a split ticket if the preferred
outcome is somewhere in the middle of the two policy extremes offered on the ballot. This
may not be with an eye toward changing the outcomes of the election, but rather some
internal reconciliation. If these theories hold, we expect that as the ideological position
of a representative gets more extreme, more individuals would vote a split ticket in order
to balance against that extreme position. Similar to the Structural/Intentional theories of
divided government, we tested for the effect of Individuallintentional motivations on splitticket voting by holding the values of the other variables constant while examining the effect
of changing the representative's position on a variety of hypothetical median voters. Table
4 shows these results.
TABLE 4

~
II

Intentional/Individual

~
NOMINRRATE =_O_.8_B_a_s_el_in_e_¥_o_t_e_r__L_ib_._P_u_r_e_I_nd_e_p_e_n_d_en_t_ _~_._C_o_n_s._,_St_r_o_ng_R_e_p_u_bl_ic_a_n_
RD

84 (1)
13 (I)

45 (3)
23 (2)

97 (0)
2 (0)

NOMINATE = 1.2
RR

72 (2)

32 (3)

94 (0)

RD

34 (3)

38 (3)

5 (1)

24 (3)
55 (4)

90 (I)
10 (2)

NOMINATE = 1.2; Change = +.04
RR
60 (4)
RD

38 (4)

Standard errorS in parentheses

As the table shows, there appeared to be good evidence for the Intentional/Individual
theories. As we can see, all of the hypothetical voters in Table 4 were less likely to split their
ticket when the representative had a moderate voting record. Holding the other factors constant,
as the representative moved to the right, we see our hypothetical Republicans becoming more
likely to vote for the Democratic candidate. Recalling that the baseline voter is an independentleaning Republican, the marginal effect was greater on the baseline voter than it was on the
strong Republican, which lines up with the theory.
What is surprising is the magnitude of the change. For our Republican-leaning hypothetical
voter, there was a substantial twelve-point average drop in the probability of casting an RR
ballot and an even larger increase in the probability of voting RD. It is not clear how the voter
connected this relatively minor shift in ideology with the need to balance the ticket in this way.
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Individual/Accidental
Finally, we turned our attention to the Individual! Accidcntal theorics. We expected that
if votcrs make a decision between the candidates only on their mcrits, national context and
representative ideology do not matter (insofar as individuals do not make a link between their
opinion of the legislator and the candidate's ideological position). Likc the other theories.
these tests examine the effect of changing the characteristics of the candidates (quality, gender,
and religion) on a slate of voters. Recall that the candidates in the district are a two-year
incumbent, male, LDS Republican, and a female Democrat who is not LDS and has never held
elective office. Again, the median voter in this case is an independent-leaning Republican who
describes himself as a conservative.
TABLE 5
I ndividuallAccidental
Baseline Voter

Not LDS

----------~------------------------

RR
DR

Female
--------

Female (Not LDS)

---------

84 (1)
13 (I)

81 (I)
16 (I)

58 (3)
26 (2)

Quality Female Candidate
84 (I)
RR
14 (I)
DR

80 (2)
18 (0)

57(3)

79 (4)

28 (2)

20 (4)

Female Republican Incumbent
66 (9)
RR
32 (9)
DR

48 (9)
49 (10)

65 (9)
34 (9)

77 (4)
19 (3)

----------S-ta-nd-ar-d-cr-ro-rs-~-:-!:!,,'" .

Holding other factors constant, gender appeared to be thc most significant factor in the
probability of straight-ticket voting. Whcn wc changed the voter from an LDS male to a nonLDS female, there was a drop in probability of voting a straight Republican ticket from a mean
of 84 percent to 58 percent,9 and the probability of casting an RD ticket doubled. Changing
the gender of the Republican incumbent from male to female showed similarly large changes.
As expected, the probability of our male, baseline voter casting an RR ballot decreases, while
the female voter was more likely to cast an RR ballot. The increases in standard error were
most likely due to the small number of female, Republican candidates from whieh the model
constructed the probabilities. 10
The effect of religion, however, was not insignificant. Recalling that the female candidate
is not LDS, we examined the effect of religion. Our non-LDS baseline voter was more likely
to vote for the Democrat, and this effect increased when we changed the gender from male to
female. The female, non-LDS voter displayed some odd characteristics. She was more likely
to vote for the male, LDS candidate than the Democratic challenger, who she arguably has the
most in common with. The probability of her voting for the Republican incumbent dropped
precipitously when we changed the candidate's gender to female. Again, this may be due to the
small pool of candidates from which the model relied on in constructing its parameters.

Conclusion
While we were unable to find any convincing support for thc Structural/Accidental and
Structural/Intentional arguments in our framework, our data analysis produced interesting
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results for the remaining two theories. We can argue that the gender of a candidate affects
voter choice under the Individual/Accidental model, validating the importance of the
personal vote. Our results also support the Individual/Intentional theory, demonstrating that
moderate voters are significantly more likely to vote a split ticket as their candidate choices
move away from moderate voting records. Our research has covered some of the wide range
of variables and explanations involved in divided government and split-ticket voting. Splitticket voting in Utah is likely influenced by individual-level motivations such as candidate
characteristics, as well as electorate policy preference and some intentional effort on the part
of voters to balance ideologies.
While our study was restricted to Utah, our findings have important implications for
the wider U.S. electorate. Drawing from a homogenous pool of candidates (not entirely
unlike the national pool), we provided evidence that individuals give considerable weight
to nonpolitical attributes of the candidates when making their vote choice. More work is
required, however, to uncover how individual voters make their choices at the polls, and our
paper suggests one way to study these intriguing problems.
NOTES
1. Standardized variables are derived by subtracting the mean of a particular variable from the
observation and dividing the resultant ditlerence by the standard error. A standardized coefficient ofx
can be interpreted as: a one unit increase in the standardized variable leads to an x standard deviation
increase in the dependent variable.
2. Utah is one of seventeen states that allow voters to select a straight-ticket option. By marking the party
of choice, the voter need not mark each individual race and is aided in casting a straight ticket. Burden
and Kimball (2002) found evidence that this option increases propensity of straight-ticket voting.
3. DW-NOMINATE, created by Jeffrey B. Lewis and Keith T. Poole, is a way to spatially map out the
ideology oflegislators. The scores serve as a useful, comparative measure of how conservative or
liberal an individual congressman or -woman is.
4. We defined candidate quality as having ever held previous elective office (Jacobson 2004).
5. Results from a multinomial probit model are very similar to the MNLM and are included in Appendix
C. Multinomial log it depends on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (llA). The most common
example of this is a model that predicts which mode of transportation an individual will take. Given
four options--1.lriving, riding a bicycle, taking a red bus, or taking a blue bus-we would theorize
that taking the red bus and taking the blue bus would be equivalent alternatives and should not be
jointly considered in the same model. If we were to run the misspecified model including both colors
of bus, the multinomiallogit, by construction, would return the probability ofcach of the three other
transportation choices against the probability of driving (the arbitrary baseline category in this case),
and these probabilities for each observation would sum to one. In this example, however, we would
theorize that the color of the bus is irrelevant, and the model would under-predict each of the bus
options. The better model would be multinomial probit, which considers each choice independent
of the other ones and presumably would return equal probabilities of taking the red bus and the blue
bus. In models of vote choice. multinomiallogit is appropriate insofar as we can assume that voting
a Republican/Democrat and Democrat/Republican ticket are not equivalent choices to the voter.
Theoretically, if one subscribes to StructurallIntentional theories or IndividuaVIntentional theories of
vote choice, this assumption may be violated. If the voter's goal is merely to balance power between the
branches or balance the policy outcomes by his or her vote, then it may not matter which party controls
which office. For the Utah voter, it seems safe to assume that a Democrat/Republican ticket is not
equivalent to a Republican/Democrat ticket, as Utah Democrats are, in general, considerably to the right
of their colleagues in the national party.
6. Simulations were created by running a logit regression with presidential vote choice (Republican or
Democrat) as the dependent variable and with demographic variables (party identification, ideology,
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religion, and information on Senate vote choice in elections, when applicable) as the independent
variables. The model predicts presidential vote correctly more than 90 percent of the time. The
parameters from that regression were used to simulate presidential vote choice in midtenn election
years. If anything, these simulated values will understate the actual propensity of split-ticket voting
because the roughly 10 percent that were incorrectly predicted are the most interesting and salient
cases when considering vote choice.
7. CLARIFY uses a bootstrapping method to calculatc simulated parameters of interest from a
variety of regression models. It also generates standard errors for its predicted values that facilitate
interpretation (Tomz et al. 2003; King et al. 2000).
R. Appendix B contains tables that list the probabilities of the voting for the other categories. They
are generally substantially smaller than the probability of voting RR or RD. As noted earlier, the
probabilities will sum to unity for any individual.
9. When the standard errors are considered, the difference could be anywhere between I Rand 34 percent.
10. This is cause for some concern. We are drawing from a rather small pool of homogeneous
candidates, which may somewhat bias our estimates.
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APPENDIX A: Summary Statistics
VARIABLE

DESCRIPTION

OPERATIONALIZATION

MEAN

STD. DEV.

MIN.

01.2

0.71

0.88

0

03

052

0.99

0

03

1.11

1.24

0

04

071

0.72

0

04

0.20

04X

-.-----------

Vote Choice

Democrat
Republican

Conservative
Liberal
Dem.*Cons.
Oem.*Lib.
Rep.*Cons.
Rep.*Lib.

Which candidates did
the respondent vote for
(or would be simulated
to vote for)'!
Does the respondent
identify as a Democrat?
Docs the respondent
identify as a Republican')
Does the respondent
identify as a Con~crvativc?
Does the respondent
identify as a Liberal?

Interaction between
Democrat and Liberal

03.4

0.17

0.75

Interaction bClwct:n
Democrat and Conservative

03.4

0.30

1.01

Interaction bdwccn
Republican and Conservative

03.4

1.25

I.Xg

Interaction between
Republican and Liberal

03.4

0.04

0.34

0

05

0.00

1.00

-2.03

Is the rcspondl!nt mak?

06

047

0.50
0.33

Stdzd. Income What is the yoter's income'?
Male
White

0

b the respondent white?

07

0.87

Respondent's reported
education

OX

4.22

1.12

LOS

Is the respondent LDS?

09

0.66

047

Active LOS

Is the respondent acti\ c
and LDS')

09.10

0.58

0.49

0

R. Primary

Was there a Republican
~

Education

Primary?
R. Prim. Pct.

O. Primary

O. Prim. Pct.

Money Parity

MAX.

What was tht:
outcome?
Was there a
Democratic
primary?

I

Primary

1.96

0

043

0.50

0

Winner's percent,
equals one if there
was no primary

0.18

021

0.5

I - Primary

0.04

021

0

What was the
outcome'?

Winner's percent,
equals one if there
was no primary

0.02

0.09

0.52

How much of the
campaign mone)
in the district is the
Republican's')

Republican's Money
divided by sum of
Democrat's and
Republican's

0.64

022

0.22

10.70

7.99

-4

27

63.65

10.27

42.5

ns

R. Last What percent of
Vote Share the vote did the
representative
last take?
Disl. R. How much docs
Pres Support the district lean
toward Republican
presidential
candidates?

Average of the
Republican
Votcsharc
in the last two
Presidential races

continued an page 28
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R. Incumbent Is there a
Republican
incumbent in
the Race')

('onfinucc/./i'om page

I

~

R. Incum.

R. locum. Years How many years?
O. Incumbent Is there a
Democratic
incum bent in
the race?

I

~

D. Incum.

O. Incum. Years How many years?
Unopposed Was there a
challenger in
the race?

I

~

No Challenger

R. Quality Has the
Republican
candidate held
prior elective oflicc?

I - Yes

O. Quality lias the Democrat?

I

~

Yes

0.57

0.50

4.29

5.50

0.24

0.43

O.~5

1.70

0.04

0.19

(US

0.36

0

O.4X

0.50

0

20

R.Male Is the Republican

male'?
R. Male*Male Is the voter also?
O.Male Is the Democrat
male?

0.90

(UO

0

I

~

Yes

0.42

0.49

0

I - Yes

I

~

Yes

0.76

OA3

0

O. Male*Male Is the voter also'!

I

~

Yes

0.36

OAR

0

R.LOS Is the Republican
candidate LDS')

I

~

Yes

0.95

0.22

0

R. LOS*LOS Is the voter also'!

I

~

Yes

0.63

OAX

0

Is the voter also active?

I - Yes

0.55

0.50

Is the Democrat LDS')

I - Yes

0.70

0.46

Is the voter also'!

I - Yes

OA7

0.50

Is the voter also active'!

I

OAI

0.49

House Margin

How many more scats
do the RepUblicans
hold in the HOllse'?

Difference between
number of
Repuhlican and
Democrat seats at
the time of the
ejection

35

52.36

104

Rep. President

Is the President
Republican?

0.69

OA6

0

R. Pres.*House
Margin

Intcraction between
Repuhlican President
and House Margin

-32.9

47.X3

104

0.76

0.7X

-0.59

1.72

0.05

0.69

-2.31

US

ON)

0.67

0

1.71

R. LOS* Act. LOS
O. LOS
O. LOS*LOS
O. LOS* Act. LOS

~

Yes

I - Yes

Stdzd. NOMINATE

What is the ideology
of the district's
representative'!

Standardized
NOMINATE
score

Lagged NOMINATE

How much (and in
what direction) has the
ideology changed from
the last Congress'!

Current

R. Incum.*
NOMINATE

NOMINATE
less the
NOMINATE
score from the
previolls Congress

Republican incumhcnt's
ideology

31

31

conrinued on page

28
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D.lncum.*

Democratic incumbent's
idcolo~----

0.09

O.19------=U:-Scr-u:m

R.locum.*Lagged

(If the representative
has sen cd more than
one term) Change Irom
previous Congress ideology

0.05

O.3K

- 0.37

1.85

D.locum.*Lagged

(If the representative
has served more than
one term) Change from
previolls Congress ideology

0.11

0.42

- 2.31

0.02

NOMINATE
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APPENDIX B: Regression Results

---------

---

----

--_._-

Multinomial Logit: Vote Choice (Straight Republican Ticket is the Base)

--._--

-------------------DDfRR

2.813
-1.98
-0.6S
0.949
-0.5
0,4

Democrat

Republican
Conservative
Liberal
Dcm.*Cons.
Dem'Lih.
Rep.*Cons.
Rep.*Lih.
Stdzd Income
Male
White
Education
lOS
Active LDS
R. Primary
R. Prim. Pet.
D. Primary
D. Prim. Pet.

-0.14
0.32
-0.04
-0.16
0.007
0.209
0.009
1.6
6.52
13.89
n.09
51.2
0.2
-0.04

Money Parity
R. Last Vote Share
Dis!. R. Pres Support
R. Incumbent
R. Incum. Years
D.Incumhent
D. Ineum. Years
Unopposed
R. Quality
D. Quality
R.Ma\e
R. Male*Male
D. Male
D. Male*Male
R. LDS
R. LDS*LDS
R. LDS*Aet. LDS
D.LDS
D. LDS*LDS
D. LDS*Act. LDS
lIolise Margin
Rep. President
R. Pres. *Housc Margin
Stdzd. NOMINATE
Lagged NOMINATE
R. Incum.*NOMINATE
D. Incum.*NOMINATE
R. locum. * Lagged
D. Incum. *Laggcd
Constant
50,956
N
30,429.30
Log Ltkchhood
0,463
Psucdo R-"quared
Standard errors In parentheses:

0.066
-2.4
-0.02
1.185
0.24
5.07
0.748
0.03
2.27

--O.OR
0.23
0.121
l.ll
-0.89
0.197
-0.65
0.194
0.5 I
0.009
- 1.71
0
-1.02
--0.15
1.703
I.R22
-0.06
-1).11
- 67.7

***

DRIRR

RDIRR

(0.076)***
(0'()X5)***

0.619
0.54
-0.36
0.347
0.1
0.12

(0.053)***
(0.074)***
(0.06)***
(0.121)***
(0.097)
(0.144)**
(0022)*
(0.146)
(0.083)
(0.021 )***
(0.334)
(0.321 )***
(0.696)***
( 1.(7)***
(6.327)***
( 13.35)***

-0.05
O.OX
0.035
OOS
0.078
0.102

o.n
-0.29
2.652
5,473
39.02
X4.77
1,46

(0.23X)
(0,005)***
(0.0 1)***
(0.465)***
(0.009)**
(0.495)**
(0. 117)**
(0.438)***
(0.181 )***
(0082)
(0.534)***
(0.144)
(0 137)*
(0.106)
(0,408)***
(0.304)***
(0.289)
(0.117)***
(0.162)
(0.161)***
(0.002)***
(0.23)***
(0.001)
(0.341 )***
(0.335)
(0.364)***
(0,497)***
(0.29X)
(0.177)
( 13.(2)***

0
2.13
0
-1.16

0.347
0,458
O.OXS
D.,!5
-0.21
0.26
0.206
0.56X
-0.29
04:1
0.43
0.04
0.5S4
0.003
0.1l05
1.14
\.X5
I.OR4
0.68
1.376
0.951
X9.2

indicates slgmficance at the O.O! Ic\·cl,

30

(O.OR4)***
(0.022)***
(0.035)***
(CU)72)***
(0068)
(0.133)
(0.019)***
(0.05)
(0.014)**
(O,08S)
(0.065)
«U1l4)***
(0249)
(02IS)
(0.505)***
(1.21 X)***
(4.196)***
(8.827)***
(0.157)***
(0.003)
(L007)
(0.323)***
(0.007)
(0.33 )***
(0.08 I )***
(0.31 X)***
(0.12)***
((LOSS)
(0.371 )***
(0.083)***
(U)96)***
«Ul71 )***
(0.29)**
(0.224)
(0.193)**
(0.093)***
(0.12S)
(0.115)***
(0001 )**
(0.16X)
(0.00 I )***
(0.243)***
(0.224)***
(0.253)***
(0.329)**
(0.203)***
(0.115)***
(S.466)***

** 0.05. * 0.1

2,4
1.09
0.59
0.36
-0,49
0.34
0.133
-0.01
0.04
0.17
0.1
0.042
0,469
I.S6
6.651
14.56
H07
16.05
1.5X2
0.06
0.074
-1.05
D.D07
2.743
0.37
4.75
I.D62
0.05
07D4
-0.01
0.02
0.OX7
OX2
-0.9
0.799
0.59

o.on
(U5S
0.019
-2.32
0.01
-0.9
(Un
1.635
.1.033
- 0.75
0.91
35.3

(0.08)***
(0.009)***
(OJ)74)***
(0.106)***
(0.007)***
(0.127)***
(0.06)**
(0129)
(0.029)
(0.2)
(0.104)
(0.02S)
(0,422)
(0,414)***
(0.857)***
(2.032)***
(9.367)
( 19S)
(0.3371***
(0.006)***
(0.012)***
(0.619)***
(0.01 I)
(0.716)***
(0.159)**
(0.515)***
(0.263)***
(0.112)
(0.72)
(0.2)
(0167)
(0 136)
(0556)
(0.388)**
(0.38)**
(0.144)***
(0.196)
(0.191 )*
(0.003)***
(0.263 )***
(0.002)***
(0.432)**
(0,466)
(0,473)***
(0.653)***
(0.416)*
(0.256)***
( 19.65)*
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Multinomial Logil and Probil Models Compared
DD/RR
MNLM
MNPM

Democrat

LXI

I.X6

Republican

L99
-0.69

L25
0.61
0.8 I
-0.21
040

Rep.*Cons.

0.95
0.50
-OAO
-0.15

Rep'Lib.

0.32

-0.27

Stdzd. Income

Conservative
Liberal
Oem.*Cons.
Oem.*Lib.

0.62
-0.54
·0.37
0.35
(l.l 0

010

*

DRiRR

MNPM

0.29
046
-0.32
0.21

-0.13
-0.06

0.02
-0.01
- 0.03

0.08

-0.06

0.03
0.04

***

(un

Male

-0.04
0.16

-0.03

0.04
0.09

White

0.01

0.00

0.08

0.05

Education

0.21

om

Active LDS

- L61

0.10
0.23
-0.30

0.08

LOS

0.16
000
LIS
4.71
10.12
IRA3
40.64

2.65
547
39.03

R. Primary

6.S2

R. Prim. PCL

13.90

D. Primary

23.09

D. Prim. Pel.

5UO

Money Parity
DisL R. Pres Support

0.20
-O.OS
O.ll7

R. Incumbent

-2AO

R. Incum. Years

-0.02

D. Incumbent

Ll9
-0.25
-5.08

R. Last Vote Share

D. Ineum. Years
Unopposed
R. Quality
D. Quality

0.75
-0.03

D. Male

2.27
-·O.OX
-0.23

D. Male'Male

0.12

R. LDS

LI2
0.89
0.20
-0.65
0.19
0.51
0.01
-1.71

R. Male
R. Male'Male

R. LDS*LDS
R. LOS*Act. LDS
D. LDS
D LDS*LDS
D. LDS·Aet. LOS

House Margin_
Rep. President

Lagged NOMINATE

000
1.02
-0.16

R.lneum*NOMINATE

D. IneuJ11. 'NOMINATE
R. Incum. *Lagged

·0.06

D. Incum. *Lagged

-0.12

Constant

67.7X

R Pres'llouse Margin
Stdzd. NOMINATE

N
log Likelihood MNLM
log Likelihood MNPM

-0.02
0.69
0.14
3.57
0.63

***
*

147
0.00

1.33
0.00

0.00
-2.74
000

0.00
·149
-0.01
-0.97

·1.16
0.35
-LOI

OA6
0.09

0.02

*

LS4

0.96
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APPENDIX C: Question Wordings
c) $SO,OOO $74,999
f) $7S,000 and over
SF) (2002~ 20(6) What do you expect your (current
year's) family income to be?
a) Under $2S,OOO
h) $2S,OOO $39,999
c) $40,000-$49,999
d) 5S0,000 $74,999
c) $7S,OOO -$99.999
f) Over $1 oO,ooa
6) Arc you:
a) Male
b) Female
7A) (19X2) Arc you:

IA) (19X2-2003) In the U.S. Representative race, who
did you vote f(x')
a) Republican Candidate
b) Democratic Candidate
113) (2004-2006) In today's election for U.S Iiouse of
Representatives, did you just vote for:

a) Republican Candidate
h) Democratic Candidate
2A) (1982 2002) In the presidential election, who did
you .i List vote for?
a) Republ ican Candidate
b) Democratic Candidate
28) (2004) In today's election for U.S. president. did
you just vote for:

a) Republican Candidate
b) Democratic Candidate
3) Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be'
a) Strong Democrat
b) Not so strong Democrat
c) Independent leaning Democrat
d) Independent
e) Independent leaning Republican
f) Not so strong Republican
g) Strong RepubJ ican
h) Other
i) Prefer not to say
4) On most political matters, do you consider yourself:
a) Strongly Conservative
b) Moderately Conservative
c) Neither, Middle of the road
d) Moderately Liberal
c) Strongly Liberal
f) Don't know, No Opinion
SA) (1982) Was your (last year's) family income:
a) Under $10,000
b) $10,000-$14,999
c) $15,000-$24,999
d) Over $SO,OOO
58) (19X4-1993) What was your (last year's) family

a) Caucasian

(19X4 199X) Arc you:
a) White
7C) (2000 20(6) Arc you:
a) White/Caucasian
SA) (19X2) What was the last grade in school you
attcnded"
a) Eighth grade or less
b) Some high school
c) Iligh school graduate
d) Some college
c) College graduate
SA) (19X4 ~20(6) What was the last year of school you
7H)

completed"
a) Did not graduate from high school
b) Completed high school
c) Come college hut not four years

d) Four years of college or morc

c) Post-graduate
9A) (19X2-19X6) What, if any, is your religious

preference?
a) Mormon
9B) (19XX) What, ifany, i~ your religious preference?

income?

a) LDS
9(') (1990 2(06) What, if any, is your religious

a) Under $10,000
b) $10,000-$14,999
c) $15,000 $24,999
d) $25,000-$39,999
c) $40,000$49,999
f) $SO,OOO and over
5C) (1990) What was your (last year's) family income?
a) Under $10,000
h) $10,000-$14,999
c) $IS,000--$24,999
d) $2S,000-$39,999
c) $40,000-$49,999
f) 550,000-$100,000
g) Over $100,000
SO) (1992-2000) What do you expect your (current
year's) flllnily income to be"
a) Under $15,000
b) $IS,000-$24, 999
c) $25,000- $39,999
d) $40,000-$49,999

preference?
a) LDS/Mormon
lOA) ( 19X2) Do you consider yourself active in the
practice ofYOlir religious preference?
a) Yes
h) Kind of
c) Not Very
d) Not Applicable
e) Prefer not to

S3)

1OI3) (19S42006) How active do you consider yourself
in the prncticc OfYOlif religiolls preference'!

a) very active
b) somewhat active

c) not very active
d) not active
e) prefer not to say
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The Effects of Foreign Aid on
Income Inequality
Tim Layton

Abstract
This article furthers the research on the inability offoreign aid to address the economic
needs of receiving states, particularly in the area of income inequality. We hypothesize that
foreign aid is distributed and used in ways that worsen inequality. Additionally, we predict
that foreign aid will cause more inequality in autocracies than democracies. While not
contradicting any existing theories on the causes of income inequality, our theory shows that
foreign aid may act as a catalyst for many of the established theories about what increases

inequality. The newly developed database offoreign aid loans (PLAID) provides data on the
independent variable, and the Gini coefficient is used as the measure ofthe dependent variable.
In addition, we control for eight separate causes of income inequality. The study includes
two panel datasets including 169 observations from twenty:four countries. To account for
limitations in the DLS, we used a Feasible Generalized Least Squared (FGLS) model. The
results suggest that a highly substantive relationship exists between foreign aid and inequality,
although the efj(!Cts may be subject to endogeneity. Holding all things constant, this .finding
shows that while aid may help the poor, it clearly benefits the rich more.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of literature criticizing the current methods
for giving foreign aid. There is an abundance of literature that suggcsts the foreign aid money
the West gives to the developing world is limited in its effectiveness (Easterly 2006; Boonc
1996; Easterly 1999; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 19n). Other scholars continue to argue that
foreign aid is effective, but only under the right conditions (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Hansen
and Tarp 200 I; Collier and Dollar 200 I; Nunnenkamp 2005). All ofthese studies use economic
growth to determine the etTectiveness of foreign aid. A few researchers have approached the
question of what other effects of foreign aid exist, such as its effects on quality oflife (Kosack
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2003), but research on many areas affected by foreign aid remain rclativcly untouched. One of
these areas is the effect of foreign aid on income inequality in the developing world.
Scholars agree that income inequality is detrimental to economic growth in the developed
world (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994). Robert Barro concluded
that the growth-retarding effect of income inequality is greater in poor countries (2000).
In democracies with majority rule or in autocracies wherc the people have some influence,
if the mean ineome exceeds the median income, redistribution occurs. The redistributive
policies retard growth in those economies (Alesina and Rodrik 1994). Inequality also causes
sociopolitical unrest (Alesina and Perotti 1996). Income inequality has been directly linked
to a reduction in happiness levels, as well (Blanchflower and Oswald 2003). This reduction is
greater among those at lower income levels and those with less education. As a result, the poor
begin to commit crime, fonn riots, and participate in other disruptive activities (Barro 2000:
Pastor 1995; Alesina and Perotti 1996). This increase in unrest hurts the economy and, more
importantly, decreases the quality of life of all people in the country, especially those without
the means to protect themselves.
Because of the detrimental economic, political, and sociopolitical effects of inequality, it
is important to understand what causes differences in inequality in various countries around
the world. Much of the developing world experiences some degree of inequality, but some
countries suffer less from economic differences. Why do these differences exist? How do
some countries escape extreme inequality, while others experience a rift between the rich and
the poor that increases in size every day? [n this paper, we theorize that one of the causes of
inequality in the developing world is the foreign aid money that the West sends in an attempt
to reduce the rift between the rich and the poor. We contend that economic growth is not the
only important factor to examine when detennining the effectiveness of foreign aid. [f aid does
increase economic growth but also increases inequality, then the goal of that aid (to reduce
poverty) is not met. The aid may also have a rcvcrse effect by increasing inequality, which then
retards growth. It is important to understand this relationship so that aid organizations may
better detennine the effectiveness of their efforts.

Review of Existing Inequality Literature
Thc study of income inequality has produced a limited amount of literature that addresses
the question of what causes changes in inequality. The literature that does exist provides a
list of socioeconomic and sociopolitical causes that fall into four related but distinct camps:
political explanations, international integration explanations, macroeconomic explanations, and
demographic explanations. Each of the camps emphasizes a particular category of independent
variables as causes for changes in income inequality. There is some overlap between the camps,
as some of the theories do not refute, but rather add to, the theories of the other camps.

Political Explanations
The political explanations camp focuses on four political causes of change in income
inequality: social spending, democracy, public sector expansion, and legislative partisan political
power distribution. Rudra and Huber et al. found that social spending must be divided into
education spending, health spending, and social security/welfare spending in order to see the true
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effects of each type of spending (Rudra 2004; Huber et al. 2006). Rudra found that only education
spending decreases inequality. She contends that social security and health spending are subject
to greater lobbying and clientelism. Huber et al. found that health and education spending have
no effect on income inequality; this finding may be due to their use of an aggregate measure that
combined the two variables into one. Huber et al. and Rudra also found that social spending
increases inequality, yet Huber et al. made this conclusion in the context of non-democracies.
This phenomenon occurs because social spending only aids those employed in the formal sector
who are usually the political elite in non-democracies.
Several studies looked into the effect of democracy on inequality (Reuveny and Li 2003;
Huber et al. 2006; Simpson 1990; Bollen and Jackman 1985). While Bollen and Jackman
concluded in 1985 that democracy has no effect on inequality, several recent studies have
reversed that conclusion, the most recent of which (Huber et al. 2006) showed that the strength
of the democratic tradition is one of the best explanatory variables for changes in inequality in
Latin America (see also Muller 1988). Reuveny and Li also made the interesting conclusion
that democracy decreases inequality when interacted with globalization, a variable that will
be discussed later. Lee also studied the effect of democracy on inequality but in the context
of public sector expansion, concluding that public sector expansion in non-democracies
increases inequality. In non-democracies, the state supports particular core industries and
client populations, which causes this inequality increase. This does not occur in democracies
where the political mechanisms allow the state to help meet the needs of the lower classes
(Reuveny and Li 2003).
Another political factor that affects inequality is the "legislative partisan political
power distribution." Huber et at. (2006) concluded that in Latin America, countries with
strong histories of left-leaning legislatures have lower inequality (see also Mahler 2004).
Their conclusion pointed to the idea that income inequality may actually be reduced by
political means.

International Integration Explanations
The second camp of scholars is made up of those that believe factors dealing with
international integration explain changes in income inequality. There seems to be a consensus
in the literature that foreign direct investment and trade both increase inequality (Alderson and
Nielsen 1999; Evans and Timberlake 1980; Reuveny and Li 2003; Gustafsson and Johansson
1999). The idea is that the money that comes into a country through FDI and trade goes to the
sector where the country has a comparative advantage, increasing incomes in that sector while
leaving all other sectors of the economy in the dust. Reuveny and Li did suggest that when trade
is interacted with democracy, it actually decreases inequality. As previously stated, this occurs
because a democracy allows a country to meet the needs of the poor.
Macroeconomic Explanations
The third group of scholars
macroeconomic factors best explain
inequality falls into this camp. This
Kuznets Curve, an upside-down U

is mostly made up of economists who believe that
changes in inequality. The original theory about income
thcory suggests that all countries are somewhere on the
(Kuznets 1955; Alderson and Nielson 1995; Robinson
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1976). Kuznets suggested that incomc inequality in countries increases as the country develops
(defined as increases in per capita income) and then dccreases after it reachcs a critical point.
Much of the literature on inequality seeks to explain why this curve exists, because most
economists do not accept changes in per capita income as an adequate explanation.
Samuel Morely put forth several additional macroeconomic explanations for inequality in
Latin America. He claimed that inflation increases inequality bccause it hits the poor harder than
the rich (Morcly 200 I; Albancsi 2007; Bulir 200 I). The rich can invcst in capital or land when
inflation occurs, and these investments do not decrease in value with infiation. The poor, however,
cannot do this because such a large percentage of their income goes toward consumption. Morely
suggested that recessions also increase inequality because they hit the poo'r harder than the rich
(Morely 1995; Psacharopoulos et al. 1995). Recessions cause unemployment, usually at the
low end of the income bracket. They also cause the rich to spend less on the goods and services
that the poor provide, decreasing the income of the poor and increasing inequality. Morely's
final explanation for inequality was change in the minimum wage (1995). He suggested that a
decrease in the minimum wage leads to more formal sector jobs, decreasing inequality, and that
an increase in the minimum wage leads to fewer formal sector jobs, increasing inequality.

Demographic Explanations
The final group of scholars explains changes in inequality using dcmographic variables. The
most prominent theory in this camp is that an increased youth population increases inequality
(Simpson 1990; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999). Young people
have less experience and are more often unemployed. They also provide a competitive pool
for employers to draw from, decreasing the wages of the youth and increasing the profits of the
employers. Huber et al. suggested that the effect on inequality of the youth population actually
decreases inequality, but only insignificantly. This finding is interesting, yet not well explained.
Morely suggested that the real explanation for inequality is not in the size of the youth population
but rather in the dependency ratio, the number of workers compared to the size ofthe family they
are supporting (1995).
Another demographic variable that helps explain changes in inequality is the percent of
the population employed in the informal sector (Huber 2006 et al.; Gustafsson and Johansson
1999; Alderson and Nielsen 1995; Nielsen 1994). The literature concludes that a higher
percent of the population employed in agriculture (high sector dualism) increases inequality
because wages are often lower in the informal sector, and the workers do not receive much of
the benefit of government social spending through social security and welfare programs.
Another demographic factor that affects income inequality is cthnic divcrsity. Therc are
certain levels of ethnic diversity or racial diversity that cause large discrepancies in income
distribution (Meisenberg 2007). When political leaders come from a particular race or ethnic
group, they tend to reward that race or ethnic group. In his article, Bayart listcd African
dictators who diverted money to tribe mcmbers (1992). This tendency to divcrt funds to the
leader's ethnic group leads to inequality; as one group is prefcrred over others, that group
obtains better jobs, government contracts, and higher income.
The final demographic explanatory variable is education. Most scholars argued that
education decreases inequality over time (Lce 2005; Morely 1995; Alderson and Nielsen
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1995; Crenshaw 1992). Education allows the poor to escape poverty and obtain jobs that pay
better wages. Widespread education also attracts widespread foreign direct investment, not
just FDI in certain sectors, but in all sectors where there are educated individuals.
Our theory that foreign aid affects changes in inequality falls into the international
integration explanation camp. Although foreign intervention through foreign aid is not the same
as intervention through trade and FDI, it still involves foreign powers or organizations investing
money into an economy. The differences are that aid organizations invest this money through the
governments of the developing countries, and the goal of the money is to improve the welfare
of the poor instead of to gain profits. The foreign aid theory does not contradict any of the
established theories about the causes for changes in income inequality. Instead, it seems that
foreign aid money acts as a catalyst for many of the established theories about what increases
inequality. Aid is used by developing countries to fund various programs that increase inequality:
education spending, health spending, social security/welfare spending, public sector expansion
in non-democracies, FDI attraction, trade liberalizing, and economic growth. Because foreign
aid supports these inequality-increasing programs, it should lead to increased inequality itself.

Why Foreign Aid Leads to Inequality
Several mechanisms describe how foreign aid money leads to an increase in inequality.
All of the mechanisms play some role in the process of aid money flowing to certain groups
and away from other groups.
The first causal mechanism exists through politics. As rational actors, politicians act to
please their supporters. Often, a politician's supporters are made up of a group of high-income
private citizens with special interests. The politicians have a vested interest in pleasing their
supporters so that the supporters help them win subsequent elections, pay living expenses, and
find employment after several faithful terms in public office. In his study on the effectiveness
of foreign aid, Boone concluded that all political systems favor a "high-income political elite"
when it comes to aid distribution (Boone 1996). He divided countries into three groups: those
with elitist governments, egalitarian governments, and laissez-faire governments. From his
evidence, he concluded that all three government types favor the high-income political elite.
Since the governments are the organizations that ultimately control how aid money is used,
it can be assumed that the money is distributed in a manner that favors those high-income
individuals who support the politicians in office. This increases the incomes of a small group
of individuals, including the politicians and their supporters, but leaves the poor essentially
in the same position before the government received the aid money, leading to an increase in
income inequality. Even if the government decides to give equal amounts of aid money to the
poor and their supporters, income inequality increases because the money given to the poor
has to be distributed among a large group. The money given to the supporters is distributed
among a much smaller group, allowing each individual to receive a larger share. Easterly
claimed that governments also have little incentive to increase the productive potential of the
poor because this might foster political activism that would threaten the politicians' and their
supporters' social and political standing (Easterly 2003).
Some argue that the conditionalities aid agencies include in loans and grants are designed
to force governments to use aid in ways that benefit the poor. The conditionalities often require
39

SIGMA
a liberalization of economic policies (which mayor may not help the poor) and improvements
in institutions. Over the last several decades, these conditional ities have been under attack
because of ineffectiveness, lack of enforcement, and lack of credibility (see Bauer 1993; Collier
et al. 1997; Leandro et at. 1999; Morrissey 2004; Svensson 2000). The conditionalities force
unwanted policies on unwilling governments. Because of this, the governments find ways to
get around the conditionalities. Sometimes they do not fully implement the policies, sometimes
they repeal the policies as soon as they get the money, and sometimes they refuse to implement
the policies and count on the benevolence of the aid organization to induce the giving of the
loan or grant without the conditionalities. Because of these problems with aid conditionalities,
the money still goes to the high-income political elites, increasing inequa·lity.
This might, however, still decrease inequality if these high-income individuals would
invest the money in the domestic economy. An increase in investment could cause economic
growth by increasing the number of jobs and the amount of credit available to all members of
society. Commonly referred to as a "trickle down" effect (Azam and Laffont 2003), this effect
does not fully occur unless the money is invested domestically, which seldom occurs (See
Easterly 1999 and Boone 1996). Investors in poor countries favor foreign markets for several
reasons. Investments in developing economies may provide more opportunity for profit, but the
associated risk often encourages local investors to look abroad. Globalization has facilitated
international investment and expanded investment choices, enabling a broader and more stable
portfolio. In cases wherc the trickle down effect does occur, inequality continues to increase
because the political elite continue to receive the majority of the funds.
The aid organizations' selection process for giving aid causes another disincentive
for politicians to improve the welfare of the poor. Logically, aid organizations make
decisions based on the needs of the poor, giving aid to those nations whose poor need it.
If the welfare of the poor improves, the aid money will eventually slow. For this reason,
the governments that receive aid money have little incentive to actually help the poor; if the
welfare of the poor docs not improve, the aid money will keep coming (Svensson 2000).
Bauer claimed that the problem is that aid goes to governments whose policies retard growth
and create poverty (1993). These countries have an incentive to keep their institutions from
improving; more economic crises means an increase in aid money (Azam and Laffont 2003).
The improvement of institutions is crucial to decreasing inequality because better, more
democratic institutions allow the government to meet the needs of the poor (Reuveny and Lee
2003). Better institutions and governance could also decrease inequality by redistributing
income through effective taxation and by decreasing the influence of the high-income
political elites through crackdowns on corruption.
International aid-giving organizations arc also subject to the interests of their member
states (Nielson and Tierney 2003), giving a new incentive to the politicians in aid-receiving
countries. If they want to receive aid, they nced to encourage programs that cause the member
countries of the aid organizations to give them aid, suggesting that the developing country is
more likely to use the money to improve its standing with the donor countries than to help the
poor. This causes an increase in income inequality because the money is spent on programs
that favor the elite that arc well connected with the West, rather than those programs that aid
the lowest income groups.
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For a moment, let us assume that aid money does actually get through the government
and is invested wisely in the domestic economy. It is logical to assume that the aid is directed
to the sector that has the highest potential to generate profits and, thus, has a potential to cause
economic growth. If the money is directed to these sectors, the owners of those sectors profit
most. The workers in those sectors should profit some as well. While the other sectors probably
experience some growth due to the success of the highly profitable sector, the growth is much
less pronounced. This causes an increase in income inequality because, while the incomes
of the members of the specified sector rise significantly, other incomes remain unchanged or
increase insignificantly.
Foreign aid can also affect inequality through the ethnic diversity hypotheses listed in the
literature review. If the political leaders who distribute the aid money belong to a particular
ethnic group, they tend to prefer that ethnic group when distributing foreign aid. They use the
aid to make sure the members of that ethnic group receive better-paying jobs. They also use
the money to directly improve infrastructure in the areas where members of their ethnic group
reside. Since the literature has established that ethnic diversity tends to lead to inequality, we
add to that literature by suggesting that one way that this relationship exists is through the
distribution of foreign aid.
From this theoretical discussion we extract two hypotheses: I) foreign aid will lead
to income inequality, and 2) foreign aid will cause more inequality in autocracies than
democracies. We suggest that this increase in inequality is caused by aggregate aid. It may
be the case that some aid programs actually decrease inequality, but the goal of this study
is to discover the effect of net inflows of foreign aid money. We hypothesize that most
of the aid distributed in the form of projects that are meant to decrease inequality is not
spent in the way that is desired by the donors. The aid is often used for other purposes that
actually increase inequality. Because of this misuse of aid and the other natural effects of
aid mentioned in our theoretical framework, we hypothesize that the net impact of aid on
inequality will be positive: foreign aid increases inequality. We used aggregate aid as our
dependent variable because of its availability and because it is the measure of aid most
frequently used in foreign aid literature (see Burnside and Dollar 2000, Hansen and Tarp
200 I, Easterly 2003).
Data Collection
The dependent variable of this study is the Gini index of income inequality. It was provided
by the United Nations' University World Inequality Database, WilD (UNU-Wider 2005). This
database provides quality ratings and other information for each ofthe observations. Following
the methods of Huber et at. (2006), we filtered the data in order to obtain the most valid
observations. First, we deleted those observations with expenditure, consumption, earnings,
or market income as the measure of income. Second, we deleted all observations that did not
include data for the entire population. The observations were given a quality rating of 1, 2, or
3, 3 being the lowest and I being the highest. We eliminated all observations with a quality
rating of 3. In many cases, there remained several observations for the same year. When this
occurred, we deleted all cases that used the household or family as the unit of analysis. Where
multiple values still existed, we deleted any observation with the quality rating of 2. A few
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multiple year observations still remained, so we averaged the remaining values. This process
yielded a dataset with valid observations and one observation per year.
There is much contention over the use of the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality.
It may not provide the most valid measure for this variable, but it is the measure with
the most available data. Because of the high level of availability in comparison to other
measures of inequality, we decided to use the Gini coefficient as our measure of inequality
for this study. The vast majority of scholarly articles in the field of inequality research have
also used this measure.
Unfortunately, the data on the Gini coefficient while much more prevalent than other
measures of inequality, is limited. For most countries, the Gini coefficient is not available
for multiple consecutive years. Because of this limited availability of data, our datasets were
limited in their inclusion of countries and years. However, we did include all of the countries
and years possible in our analysis.
Data for our independent variable, foreign aid, comes from a newly developed comprehensive database of foreign aid loans and grants called the Project-level Aid Database
(PLAID) (Brigham Young University 2007). PLAID is a database currently under construction by Brigham Young University and the College of William and Mary. The project has been
funded by the National Science Foundation and is currently under consideration for further
funding from the Gates Foundation. Its database contains bilateral and multilateral loans and
grants to all countries across the world since 1970. While the database is still under construction, the data it provides is more complete than any other data source for foreign aid inflows
because it includes data from the OEeD and the World Bank. We use aggregate foreign aid
data for each country each year there is a Gini coefficient. The aggregate data is obviously
less descriptive than disaggregated. In fact, it is possible that some types of aid may decrease
inequality. Upon the completion of the PLAID database, we will run further tests to determine
which types of loans cause income inequality to increase and which types cause income inequality to decrease. Nevertheless, this aggregate study should reveal the overall net effect of
foreign aid on income inequality. We expect this relationship to be positive because recipient
countries use this aid at their own discrction. Aid money intended for income equalizing programs may be misused, as our theory predicts. Wc followed the trend in the current literature
by using an aggregate aid database.
Our study also includes several independent variables established in the literature to allow
us to understand the effects of our independent variables after controlling for the explanatory
variables that scholars have established. Summary statistics for these variables, along with our
independent and dependent variables, appear in Table 1. Following the table are theoretical
explanations for including each of the control variables.
Inflation
Several authors agreed that inflation promotes inequality. Morley argued that labor markets
lag when adjusting to high inflation (200 I, 72). This lag causes a decrease in real wages, which
hurts minimum wage workers proportionately more than other workers. The IDB (1998) and De
Ferranti et at. (2004) suggested that hyperinflation has strong effects on inequality. We agreed
with these authors and hypothesized that inflation increases income inequality. To measure
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Model Including Agricultural Employment
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Gini Coefficient

169

!'(7S45

.4764

7.9914

9.7739

Agricultural Employment

169

27.6317

8.5415

14.8644

43.6666

Youth Population

169

22.8479

15.0327

I

66.7

FDI Net Inflows

169

3190000000

7070000000

0

43800000000

Inflation (GDP Deflator)

169

90.6111

312.5484

-23.4789

2509.465

Ethnic Diversity

169

.4116

.2419

.007

.859

Polity Democracy Scores

169

5.515

5.5152

-7

10

Log Foreign Aid

169

20.5092

1.3323

13.6523

1023.1212

Polity X Log Foreign Aid

169

3.75112

.2972

3.1224

4.1865

inflation, we use the World Bank's World Development Indicator's measure of inflation, the
GDP deflator (WDI 2005).

Education
The literature suggested that education also has an effect on inequality. As a country
becomes more educated, more people obtain meaningful employment. This increase in
employment causes inequality to decrease. Measures for education are plentiful, but many
of those measures are unavailable for countries and years in our sample. Because of this, we
chose to use the most widely available measure of education, the literacy rate (WDI 2005).
Youth Population
The argument that inflation hurts unskilled workers is extended to the variable of
demography. The youth population is one of the principal suppliers of unskilled labor. Many
authors made a link between youth population and income inequality. Alderson and Nielsen
argued that a large youth population causes an oversupply of unskilled workers, thus driving
down the wage of unskilled labor (1999). Therefore, we expect that a high youth population
increases inequality. For this data we used the World Bank's World Development Indicators,
WDI (2005). This dataset provides a percentage of each nation's population younger than
fifteen years. We used this percentage as the measure of youth population in a society.
Agricultural Share o/GDP
There were differing views regarding employment in agriculture and its effects on
income inequality. Alderson and Nielson argued that decreasing proportions of employment
in agriculture increase inequality, based on the assumption that inequality in the agricultural
sector is lower (1999). Huber et al. argued the opposite for Latin America. They found that the
Gini index in urban areas suggests less inequality than in rural areas (2006). Thus, increased
employment in agriculture leads to greater inequality. Because of the limited availability of data
on employment in agriculture, we used the World Bank's WDi (2005) to obtain the agricultural
share of GDP. We used this data as the measurement of employment in agriculture.
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Ethnic Diversity
Some literature argued that ethnic divisions create more inequality. Oe Ferranti ef al.
(2004) argued that this inequality is better explained by differences within ethnic groups instead
of between them. However, we predict that countries with higher levels of ethnic diversity
have more inequality. People seck to elect politicians from their same ethnic group, and these
politicians return favors to people of their ethnic group. This promotes income inequality along
ethnic lines. We used the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization index, ELF (Roeder 200 I), as the
measure of ethnic diversity. The ELF index is an estimate ofthe probability that any two people
in a population will belong to the same ethnic group. The data supplied a probability value for
the years 1961 and 1985. We selected the 1985 value because it is more relevant to our research.
We expected those countries with a lower value in the ELF index (more ethnically diverse) to
have more income inequality.
Democracy
Many theorists agree that democracy provides institutions that empower the poor. This
provides more opportunity for redistribution mechanisms. As the level of democracy increases,
politicians are more responsive to the needs of the citizens. Thus, one would expect that
democracy would decrease inequality. The empirical data has been ambiguous in many studies,
but Reuveny and Li (2003) found a significant relationship between democracy and inequality
when controlling for trade openness. We agreed with Reuveny and Li and hypothesize that our
model will yield a negative relationship between the level of democracy and income inequality.
We used data from Polity IV as a measure for democracy (CIDCM 2004). The Polity IV dataset
provides a measure of democracy and a measure of autocracy. The sum of these two measures
is the polity score.
GDP per capita (PPP)
The dominating theory regarding economic development and income inequality is
Simon Kuznets' (1995) inverted U-shaped curve. At lower levels of development, income
inequality increases as per capita income increases. At higher levels of development,
income inequality decreases as per capita income increases. In our dataset, we focus on
countries that receive foreign aid. It is safe to assume that most of these countries are at
lower levels of development, so we predict that per capita GOP growth increases income
inequality. Our measurement of per capita GOP (Purchasing Power Parity) comes from the
WDI (2005) data.
FDI-Percentage ofGDP
Many authors agreed that the inflow of foreign direct investment has a positive effect on
inequality. Reuveny and Li found this to be the case for a sample of countries from around the
world (2003). Tsai found that this effect of foreign direct investment on inequality is region
specific (1995). Huber et al. hypothesized that FOI increases inequality in Latin American
and the Caribbean because this type of investment applies to capital-intensive industries that
provide relatively few jobs (2006). However, the jobs provided are relatively well paying.
For this variable, we usc the WDI to determine foreign direct investment as a percentage of
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GOP (2005). We used the percentage of GOP that comes from FDI because only net inflows
of FOI that make up a significant portion of the country's GOP, not just high inflows of FDI,
should afIect inequality.

Other Variables
In our literature review, several additional variables were mentioned. The first of these is
social spending. Both Huber et al. (2006) and Rudra (2004) suggested that social spending has
a positive impact on inequality in developing countries. The logic behind this effect is sound,
but the results seem questionable. When deciding whether or not to include this variable, we
weighed the cost of losing a large number of cases due to holes in the social spending data
against the benefit of including a slightly significant control variable. We decided that the cost
outweighed the benefit and left out the variable.
Huber et al. (2006) also found that the legislative partisan political power distribution
has an effect on income inequality. We would have controlled for this variable, but we could
not obtain the data required. However, the variable only became extremely significant after
controlling for the interaction between democracy and social spending. Since we could not
include the social spending variable, we determined that our results would not be harmed by
omitting the legislative partisan political power variable.
The final variable omitted from our study was the minimum wage. Morely (1995)
suggested that a high minimum wage tends to increase inequality because of its effect in
causing a lower number of people to be employed in the formal sector.

Methodology
To test the relationship between foreign aid and income inequality (Gini coefficient),
we used two unbalanced panel datasets. The first dataset omits a control variable, percent of
total employed population employed in agriculture, because of its limited coverage throughout
the time period. The second dataset includes the agricultural employment variable but has a
smaller sample size. We ran tests on both datasets to test for the robustness of our results across
difference sample sizes and different control variables.
Model I (omitting agricultural employment) includes 211 observations from twentynine developing or transition countries from 1975 to 2002. The countries included in the first
dataset are: Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, EI
Salvador, Estonia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico,
Moldova, Paraguay, the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Post-Communist Russia, Slovenia, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela. Modcl 2 (including agricultural employment) includes 169
observations from twenty-four countries from the same time period as the first dataset. The
countries included in the second dataset are the same as those included in the first dataset minus
Bangladesh, Belarus, Moldova, and Sri Lanka. We selected countries and years based on the
availability of Gini coefficicnts in the WIDER database. We also selected the countries based
on the availability of key control variables. The lack of inequality data was problematic, but
we made make due with what was available. Because of data availability problems, this group
docs not represent a truly random sample of devcloping and transition countries. As is evident
in the lists of countries, there are no African countries in the sample. The results of this study,
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then, cannot necessarily be generalized to developing African nations. However, the sample does
include a fair number of eountries from Europe, Asia, South America, and Central America,
allowing for some generality of the results of this study throughout those regions.
Attempting to estimate regression models from panel data presents several problems
that must be addressed. First, with most panel data, the errors produced by ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression models exhibit strong heteroskedasticity-that is, there is not
constant variance across the error terms. Heteroskedasticity causes OLS to use incorrect
standard errors when producing t statistics for thc coefficients. Normally, this problem may
be corrected for by using robust standard errors that provide the correct t statistics for the
coefficients. However, heteroskedasticity also causes the OLS estimators to be poor linear
unbiased estimators. This problem can also be corrected, and we will discuss our method
for doing so below. The second problem that occurs whcn using OLS to estimate a model
using panel data is correlation between the error terms (autocorrelation). Autocorrelation
often occurs in panel data bccause of the time-series nature of the data. The errors are not
independent of each other because they rely somewhat on the errors that precede them.
Autocorrelation also causes OLS estimated t statistics to be invalid and OLS estimators to
be poor linear unbiased estimators. Because of these violations of key assumptions ofOLS,
certain strategies must be used to allow for the best estimation of the models.
There are several ways to overcome the problems of au toe orrelation and heteroskedasticity.
but it would first be wise to test for the existence of the two violations of OLS. In order to
test for serial correlation between the errors, we used a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in
panel data (Statacorp 2007). For Model I, the test suggested that we could reject the hypothesis
of no first order autocorrelation with 90 percent confidence. For Model 2, the test suggested
that we could reject the same hypothesis with 99.9 percent confidence. Because of the high
probability that autocorrelation exists, we corrected for this problem. In order to test for
heteroskedasticity, we first ran a generalized least squares (GLS) regression (which we will
discuss more in depth later) allowing for heteroskedasticity. Secondly, we ran the same GLS
regression forcing homoskedasticity. We then used the results to run an LR test to determine the
statistical significance of the restriction placed on the model; in other words. we tested to see if
the models were significantly different when allowing for heteroskedasticity and when forcing
homoskedasticity. The LR tests for both models produced results suggesting that we could reject
the hypothesis ofhomoskedasticity in the original model with 99.9 percent confidence.
Because we found that the OLS model for our data exhibits both autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity, we must transform the model to obtain maximum likelihood estimators
and valid t statistics. There are several ways to transform panel models to correct for these
problems. We chose to use a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model because it does
a fairly good job of correcting for these problems. OLS assumes constant variance among the
error terms and an absence of covariance between the error tenns, but we have shown that
these assumptions are invalid for our models. An FGLS model transforms the OLS model by
multiplying the dependent variable, the independent variables, and the error terms by the square
root of a matrix n that is equal to the quantity a 2C, where a 2 is an unknown constant and C is a
known G x G matrix where G is equal to the number oflinear equations involved in the model, or
the number of countries (Wooldridge 2002). Because C is usually unknown in GLS estimation,
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FGLS estimation is used to estimate it. When !1 is used to transfonn the model, FGLS produces
estimators that are consistent, unbiased, and of minimum variance. The transfonnation also forces
the variance/covariance matrix to have constant variance down the diagonal and zero covariance
in the upper-left and lower-right portions of the matrix. This variance/covariance matrix produced
by the transfonned model now complies with the OLS assumptions ofhomoskedasticity and no
autocorrelation. Because of this, the t statistics are valid and the estimators are the best lUlbiased
linear estimators. According to Wooldridge, the FGLS model also complies with the first
assumption ofOLS, nonnality, because the transfonnation causes the model to be asymptotically
nonnal, providing completely robust estimators (Wooldridge 2002).
The FGLS model still makes several strong assumptions, however, that could cause
problems for the model. The FGLS model assumes that the effects of the independent variables
on the dependent variable are equal across all of the countries and time periods. We would hope
that this is the casc, but it is possible that it is not. The FGLS model also uses a zero conditional
mean assumption [E(u,IX) = 0] which implies that every element of Xi and ui are lUlcorrelated
where u, represents the error tenns. This assumption may also be violated, but we hope that it is
not. Other models may do a better job of providing the best linear unbiased estimators without
making such "heroic" assumptions as FGLS. A preferred model is the Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions model. While this model may provide better estimators, it requires larger samples
than those which are available to us within each unit (country). Because of this, a Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions model is infeasible. However, despite the possible violation of the FGLS
assumptions, according to Wooldridge, "the FGLS is more efficient than any other estimator that
uses the orthogonality conditions, E(Xu) = 0" (Wooldridge 2002). Because of the efficiency of
the FGLS estimators, we have chosen to model our data using a FGLS model.
Other problems may exist with our model because of a possible difficulty with endogeneity.
It is possible that income inequality causes foreign aid payments rather than the other way
around. This problem could be overcome by including a lagged dependent variable on the right
side of the equation, making an autoregressive model; however, the extreme lack of data on the
dependent variable prevents us from including a lagged dependent variable. In the future, we
may attempt to control for this problem by using software to impute past values. We also hope
that the availability of income inequality data will improve in the future to allow for better testing
of hypotheses like ours. For now, we are content with our model that does not include a lagged
variable, and we will rely on our theoretical framework for the relationship between foreign
aid and inequality to establish the definite possibility that foreign aid actually causes income
inequality to increase~ Nevertheless, the potential endogeneity problem may cause our estimators
to be incorrect.
Despite these myriad problems, we are confident that our model provides consistent,
best linear unbiased estimators to show how each of our independent variables affects
income inequality.
Results
The results of the analysis are found in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 contains the results of the
initial FGLS regressions, and Table 3 contains the results of the FGLS regression including
additional variables. We will first focus our discussion on the results in Table 2.
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Table 2: Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) Regressions of the Rela-tionship Be~een
_ _ ~reign Aid and In~ome In~quality_ (Omitting Agricultur~1 EmPloyment)_ _ _ _
Independent Variables

Model I

Model 2

Model 3

Log GOP per capita (PPP)

2.9990···
(.6090)

2.9008···
(.5851)

2.7RR4···
(.5852)

Youth Population

.9596**·
(.0645)

(8g:~~'.-.-- - /~~~:~=~

.1202**·

.1239*·*

FDI percent of GOP

.

--------. --.-- ------------

I
1

I
.1

.1311**·

I,

I

____ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.:..(.0_4_2.:..1)_ _ _ _ _CO_40_4_)_ _ _ _(_.0_40_4_) _ _ __
Inflation (GOP Deflator)
.0059·**
.0051*··
.0048··
(.0017)
(.0016)
(JlO 16)
14.0200*·*
(2302)
------------.3516*··
Pol ity Democracy Scores
(.0883)

15.2084··*
(2.2276)

14.7894***
(2.2275)

.3251·**
(.0850)

1.2034
(.9248)

Log Foreign Aid

1.4414***
(.3401)

1.4225***
(.9248)

Ethnic Diversity

-------- ----

-----.

----

------

------------

.0749·
(.0452)

Polity X Log Foreign Aid
Constant

---16.1642··*
(5.4625)

-42.2893***
(8.0932)

-40.94772*·*
(8.0814)

R-Squared
N

0.684
211

0.709
211

0.7123
211

The dependent variahle is the logg.cd (jim CoclliClcnt. The \alues outsIde nfthe parenthesis arc the (ILS cslimatcs of the coefficIent"
The numhers Inside the parenthesis arc the standard errors. The prohahility 1. IS as follmvs: * 11'-.1, **=p',.05._*_**_-_r~_-(_Il_ _ _

-.J

The model presented in Table 2 attempts to replicate the results suggested by the literature.
All of the variables that are discussed in the literature review proved to be significant except
for agricultural employment. Because of its insignificance in initial estimations of all of the
models, we left out the agricultural employment variable in the final estimations. Model I
shows that all of the variables except for democracy are correlated with income inequality in the
hypothesized directions. GOP per capita, youth population, FOI as a percent of GOP, inflation,
and ethnic diversity all increase inequality. It is interesting to note, however, that democracy
is significantly positively correlated with inequality. This goes against the literature, which
establishes a nonexistent or negative relationship. Perhaps a ruling majority in a democracy
could use its power to repress a large minority, helping the majority and hurting the minority.
This could cause inequality to rise.
Model 2 adds the key independent variable, foreign aid, as an explanatory variable for
inequality. Again, all of the control variables, except democracy, are significant and correlated
in the hypothesized direction. As we hypothesized, the regression results also suggest that a
significant positive relationship exists between foreign aid and inequality. The null hypothesis
that there is no relationship between foreign aid and inequality can be rejected with over 99.9
percent confidence.
Model 3, the final model, also adds the interaction variable, testing for a magnified effect
of foreign aid on inequality in democracies. The regression results show that the interaction
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is positive, but only slightly significant. The null hypothesis that there is no additional effect
in democracies can be rejected with 90 percent confidence, not the 95 percent benchmark
we would like. However, the relationship is positive as the theory suggests. The final model
produced by the regressions is as follows:
Income inequality = -40.95 + 2.78(Ln(GDP per capita)) + 0.86(youth pop) + 0.13(FDI) +
0.0048(injlation) + 14.80(ethnic) - 1.20(democracy) + 1.42(Ln(aid))+ .07(aid*democracy)+ E
It is important to note that the results of these regressions have proven robust to several
different tests. The foreign aid variable remained positive and significant when using GLS
fixed effects models, GLS random etTects models, FGLS models, OLS models controlling
for year and country, and models including more independent variables which proved
insignificant. We also ran regressions using a dataset that contained values imputed using the
statistical program Amelia to determine whether or not the results would be robust to a large
increase in the sample size. The dataset, including the imputed values, had about 360 cases
and produced similar results for the etTect of foreign aid on inequality, proving the robustness
of the results. We concluded that the two additional variables, foreign aid and the interaction
variable, added significant explanatory power by running a Chow test. The test suggested that
the two variables were important.
To provide further interpretation of the results, we will examine the coefficients for the
variables. In the final model, the coefficient for foreign aid is 1.4225. Because the foreign
aid variable is a logged variable, this coefficient can be interpreted to mean that a 1 percent
increase in aid flows causes a 1.4225 point increase on the Gini index, a substantively
significant relationship. Because the Gini coefficient is a slow-moving variable, an increase
of 1.42 points is large. This relationship is especially significant after observing that many
activists are currently calling for a doubling of aid, or a 100 percent increase. Our results
suggest that an increase of this magnitude would cause income inequality to increase rapidly.
Further significance of the aid variables may be determined by examining the r-squared
values of each of the regressions. The r-squared value of the initial model (without the aid
variables) was 0.684, suggesting that 68.4 percent of the variance in income inequality can
be explained by the control variables. This is a large portion of the variance and suggests that
the original model explained much of the change. The r-squared value for the final model
was 0.712, suggesting that the aid variables explained an additional 3 percent of the variance
in inequality. This may seem like a small increase, but because the goal of this study was to
determine whether or not aid explained any of the variance in inequality, and not to determine
a list of causes of inequality, a 3 percent increase is significant. As mentioned earlier, a Chow
test was also used to determine that the aid variables were important to the model.
Another way to determine the explanatory power of the final model is to examine some of
the predictions the model made. We ran a regression with the last two cases (Venezuela 2001,
2002) omitted and then predicted the Gini values for those two cases. The model predicted that
the 200 I value would be 47.96 and the 2002 value would be 45.02. The actual values for these
two years were 46.39 and 47.52 respectively. These predictions were fairly accurate; however,
the model seems to be inconsistent at either over predicting or under predicting. This could be
a problem, but comparing the predicted values to the actual values on the chart below (Figure
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I) shows that the model predicts the Gini coefficient on a fairly consistent basis. Because o
this, we assume that the forecasting ability of the model is relatively strong. These variable
do an excellent job of explaining variance in income inequality.
Figure I: Predicted Values vs. Actual Values
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In Table 3, we include the agricultural share of GDP and literacy as additional control
variables and also add multiple lagged foreign aid variables. We will discuss the purpose of
these lagged variables below; the reasoning for including the agriculture and literacy variables
is found above.
The first model found in Table 3 presents the control variables we extracted from the
literature. Some differences exist between this model and the previous models. One of the major
differences is the direction of the relationship between GDP per capita and inequality. In these
models, the direction appears negative; previously the relationship appeared positive. Perhaps
this difference exists because of the ambiguity of the relationship between GDP and inequality.
Because the relationship changes as GDP increases, it is hard to tell the nature of the actual
relationship in a normal regression. The significance of the variable also seems to fluctuate from
regression to regression. The other variables remain significant in this first model.
The addition of the literacy and agricultural share of GDP variables provided some
interesting findings. The model suggests that higher literacy rates actually lead to higher
inequality. It is possible that literacy is an indicator of education, and when education is higher,
more inequality exists. This relationship could be explained by the idea that higher education
leads to a higher variation in jobs, with a higher variation in income from those jobs. Higher
education may also lead to a larger job market, which increases competition among the workers
and decreases wages. The other interesting finding presented in this model is the idea that as the

agricultural share ofGDP increases, ine'luali.ty decreases. This is different from the hy?othesized
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Table 3: Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) Regressions of the Relationship Between
Foreign Aid and Income Inequality (Omitting Agricultural Employment)
Independent Variables
I

Model I

Model 2

Model 3

Agricultural Share ofGDP
~.6534***
-.54S9***
-.4680***
______________ ~_ .._ _ ~9__'.)__~________,(,_.1_2_86__,_)__~_____,_(._13_6_7"_)~_
Log GDP per capita (PPP)
-2.3232**
-1.852*
-1.0661
_ _ .~_LI~_~~~
(1.072)
(1.1452)
Youth Population
1.2302***
1.176***
1.1351 ***
(.0928)
(~Og88)
(~0937)
Literacy

.1688***
(.0632)

FDI share ofGDP

~0638*

.0896**
(.0399)
.0047***
.0041 ***
(.001-'5)_______'_(._00_1_5,-)___
8~697***
9.474***
(2.406)
(2~518)

(~0388)

.0052***
(.0016)
8.194***
(2.508)

Ethnic Diversity

.2099***
(.0633)

~0727**

~__________~_~__ ~_<:0404)

Inflation (GDP Deflator)

.2217***
(.0618)

.4420***
.4032***
-1.347*
(.0839--"-)______--"-(._08_0_9)'---_____--"(._92_2_1'---)_ _
1.419***
1.2236***
(.3269)
(.4776)

Democracy
Foreign Aid (logged)
Foreign Aid (lagged I yr)

3.15e-IO
(4.88e-IO

Foreign Aid (lagged 2 yrs)

U\8e-IO
(4.55e-IO)
.0857**
(.0447)

Aid X Democracy
~---~--

~-.

~--

..- -

----.--~~--------------------'---------

Constant

13.0719*
(11.6177)

-24.1305**
(14.049)

R-Squared
N

0.727
210

0.749
.734
201
210
---------------------

-26.374**
( 15.0213)

rhe dependent \ariahk is the logged (jim coefficient. The valuc~ outside urthe parenthesis an; the GLS estimates of the coefficietlts.
The numher~ inSIde the parenthesIs arc the standard t:ITors. Thc probability /.. i~ a~ follows: * =p<.I, ** .p~ .05, *** --.ep_<_O_1____~

positive relationship. It could be that the agricultural share ofGDP increases as fanners begin to
become more efficient and better at fanning. [fthis is the casc, the incomes of fanners should bc
increasing and inequality should be dccreasing. This finding does fall in line with the findings of
Crenshaw (1992). The logic behind these relationships is not incredibly solid, but the findings
are quite interesting.
Model 2 adds our foreign aid variable. The relationship observed in thc models from
Table 2 is observed again in this tablc. After controlling for literacy and the agricultural share
of GDP, both significant explanatory variables for inequality, foreign aid remains highly
significant. The cocfficient for foreign aid also remains about equal to the coefficients found
in the models discussed above. This suggests that a highly substantive relationship exists
between forcign aid and inequality and that this rclationship is robust to changes in the model
and sample sizc.
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We also ran one final regression to test for the time effects of aid on inequality. Pieces of
our causal logic require time for aid to actually increase inequality, so we created two lagged
foreign aid variables. The first variable is a lag of one year, and the second variable is a lag
of two years. We included both lags in our final model, which produced some interesting
findings. Neither ofthe lagged variables was significant when controlling for the current year's
aid. However, further tests showed that both of the lagged variables had significant effects on
inequality on their own, not controlling for the current year's aid. Because of this. there is still
some ambiguity surrounding the relationship between foreign aid and inequality. The results
have two possible implications. The first is that aid has a real effect on inequality. but that
effect is instantaneous; it does not occur over time. The second is that the relationship between
aid and inequality is endogenous; inequality could cause aid organizations to give more aid.
Because both of these relationships are possible, it is diff1cult to make solid conclusions about
the relationship from these tests. Further research must be done. including more observations
and further tests, in order to reveal the true relationship between aid and inequality. However.
even if the relationship is occurring in the other direction (inequality causing aid), this is a new
and significant finding. Nobody has ever suggested that aid organizations are concerned with
inequality. Through this selection process, aid organizations may be looking for countries that
have worse inequality so they can usc aid to decrease that inequality and, therefore. improve the
conditions for economic growth. This would be a positive impact of the selection process.
The insignificant nature of the lagged variables is still quite interesting, however. If
aid has no effect on inequality over time, it is failing with respect to its goal of decreasing
inequality. Aid is either helping nobody or it is helping the rich and the poor rather than just
the poor. This finding has implications somewhat similar to the implications that come from a
positive relationship between aid and inequality. Aid is not doing what it is meant to do. and
this may impact some donors' willingness to give.

Implications and Conclusions
The analysis of this data supports our theoretical framework suggesting that foreign aid
increases income inequality in developing and transition nations. The quantitative tests show
that foreign aid is a robust explanatory variable for increases in inequality in these nations.
While the limited sample of countries precludes us from generalizing our results to all nations
across the globe. the varying characteristics of the countries studied allow for some conclusions
to be made. It must be remembered, however. that our sample included no African countries,
meaning that these results cannot be applied to African nations. Nevertheless, our datasets do
include multiple countries from Eastern Europe, Asia, South America, and Central America,
making it possible to generalize our results to those areas.
The quantitative analysis suggests that the effect of foreign aid on income inequality is
statistically and substantively significant. After controlling for all the other factors, increases
in foreign aid are related with limited increases in inequality. It must be remembered, however,
that foreign aid is intended to increase the well being of the poor alone. Most aid-giving
organizations obtain contributions and operate under the goal of decreasing world poverty.
Thus, our finding that foreign aid has a small but statistically significant effect on inequality
is important. We have found that while aid may help the poor, it is obviously helping the rich
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more, which is a problem. Most contributors to organizations that provide aid assume their
money is used for the poor. While there is a chance that these donors would still be satisfied
if they knew a small portion of their money helped the rich, they would probably not be
satisfied knowing that their money increases the incomes of the rich more than the incomes
of the poor, an implication of our findings.
While the etTect of foreign aid on income inequality may be small, it exists, and it
causes inequality to increase in these developing countries where inequality is already a
problem. Inequality causes slowed growth, higher crime rates, and other serious problems
across the world. One goal of foreign aid is to decrease this inequality and provide better
lives for the poor. This goal is not being met; even worse, the opposite is occurring. Foreign
aid causes inequality to increase.
Foreign aid money is given to these countries every year in amounts equaling
millions and sometimes billions of dollars. If those amounts are causing a small increase
in inequality every year, after ten or fifteen years, inequality will be much higher than it is
today. This will cause the growth that foreign aid is meant to encourage to slow or stop and
extreme hardship for many of the citizens of these developing countries, while providing
unnecessary luxuries for a select few.
We do not mean to suggest that aid organizations should cease giving aid. We do suggest,
however, that the way in which aid is given to these developing countries improve. It is obvious
from our results that foreign aid is not decreasing inequality but increasing it. Because of
this, aid organizations should reevaluate their methods for giving foreign aid. Careful analysis
should be performed using the newly released Project-level Aid Database (PLAID) to determine
which types of aid cause increases in inequality and which types of aid cause decreases. Aid
organizations should then focus their etTorts on providing aid through those which decrease
inequality. The PLAID database provides scholars and aid workers with a comprehensive
database of aid loans and grants classified by project type. This data could be used to determine
each type of aid project's etTects on inequality. We suggest that aid organizations intensifY their
level of responsibility and use their money to improve the conditions and the incomes of the
poor more than the rich. If reducing inequality, one of the key goals of foreign aid, is not met,
the way in which aid is distributed should be changed.
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Without Distinction: Testing Realist
Theory with the International
Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination
John Mahler

Abstract
This article tests realist theory using a case study on the International Convention on
the Elimination ojAll Forms ofRacial Discrimination. It provides a briefoverview ofrealism
and gives four hypotheses about how anti-discrimination law is consistent with realist ideas:
1) states form andjoin the ICERD, 2) the convention will allow a noncommittal membership,
3) enforcement is conditional on state involvement and agreement, and 4) ICERD has a
limited ability to change structures. Using qualitative evidence from the writings ofICERD
and the reaction 0.( various states to treaty provisions, the article shows that ICERD is a
relatively weak bodv, yet it has still influenced national laws and state actions. While fidl
compliance to the convention may never be attainable, ICERD has been partially successful
in helping the UN/ii/fill its mandate. The test has produced mixed results on how well realist
theory describes the origination, development, and implementation of ICERD.
Introduction
Suppose ... that there were some ... distinction made between men upon account of their
different ... fea.tures, so that those who have black hair ... or grey eyes should not enjoy
the same privileges as other citizens; can it be doubted but these persons, ... united together
by one common persecution, would be as dangerous to the magistrate as any others that
had associated themselves merely upon the account of religion? ... There is only one thing
which gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is oppression ..
-John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration
John Locke wrote more than three hundred years ago about how distinguishing someone
based on hair or eye color would be dangerous. Since John Locke's time, much has been done to
propagate intolerance, promote tolerance, and combat discrimination, whether that discrimination
is based on religion, race, or some other method for classifying humanity. International action
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has been coupled with national action against discrimination as international organizations such
as the United Nations (UN) have become more involved in interstate relations and even domestic
affairs. The primary instrument combating racial discrimination is the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
ICERD was opened for signature and ratification on 21 December 1965 and entered into
force approximately three years later on 4 January 1969 (UN GA Resolution 2106). Since
then, many states have become party to the convention, and the Committee on Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has worked actively with states' parties to implement laws
against racial discrimination.
The development of anti-discrimination law in the internatiohal arena otTers an
interesting case to test the realist theory in political science. To formally test the theory. I
will first provide a brief overview of realism and give hypotheses about anti-discrimination
law consistent with realist ideas; these hypotheses will then form the structure for the
paper. Each section will include qualitative evidence from ICERD's writings and work. the
reaction of various states, and the interaction of the committee and states' parties for the
implementation of treaty provisions.

Realism
In the fifth chapter of the Twenty Years Crisis, E.H. Carr established the basic tenets of
realist thought. Realism attempts to explain the world not in terms of moral absolutes but in the
actions of imperfect people. Carr established threc foundations of realist theory. First, history
is a series of causes and effects that may be understood through analysis. Second, theories do
not exist independently of reality. Third, "morality is a product of power." In other words,
without central authority there can be no right or wrong; there is no such thing as a natural
right, because no such rights exist independently of power. I
Realism has changed since Carr wrote his book. In addition to these foundational
principles, realists such as Hans 1. Morgenthau and Kenneth N. Waltz focused on "the limits
imposed on states by the international distribution of material resources" (Legro and Moravcsik
1999,6). Waltz has written clearly and indefatigably on structural realism. The following is
a list of vital points extracted from his "Structural Realism After the Cold War" and "The
Emerging Structure of International Politics":
International politics operate among self-interested, security-minded states. Also. states
must maintain internal security while keeping a close eye on world developments in
order to maintain power (2000.6, 37).
• States compete for wealth as well as power and will watch the development of other
countries closely for signs of changes in the power structure. Thus. states may seek a
greater role in international organizations as a road to power (2000,33-4).
• States have at least two options in the international structure: balancing or bandwagoning;
bandwagoning is often easier. though perhaps not as effective (2000. 38).
International relations are dominated by the bipolar structure of the Cold War (2000.
39). Also, the bipolarity of the Cold War system predicts that the Soviet Union and the
United States would act similarly (1993, 46). This manifests itself in the convention
on at least two occasions; the inclusion of anti-Semitism and the denial of the need
•
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to vastly change laws. The Soviet excuse was no discrimination; the U.S. excuse was
protecting other rights.
• "[Uncertainty) about the future does not make cooperation and institution building
among nations impossible; [it does) strongly condition their operation and limit their
accomplishment;" thus, dramatic shifts in structure are highly unlikely (2000, 41).
• With the end of the Cold War, the world disarmed to a degree rather quickly; however,
"leaders saw that without ... constructive efforts the world would not become one
in which [people) could safely and comfortably live" (1993, 55). This idea may be
applicable during Cold War times, as well.
I derived four hypotheses from this list. First, realists predict that states hesitate to join a
convention unless a compelling security concern existed; however, states may see participation
as a method to interact with other states and consolidate power, or states may relish the
opportunity to jump on the bandwagon. In ICERD's formation, it is likely that the U.S. and
the Soviet Union would play significant roles. Second, realists hold that states would agree on
only a noncommittal treaty, allowing themselves to pull out should compliance become too
costly. Third, the strength of the enforcement mechanism would be conditional on the strength
and involvement of states' parties. Thus, ICERD should have little power independently and
would have a weak enforcement mechanism. Finally, ICERD would not dramatically change
either internal or external affairs, and its accomplishments would be limited.

Hypothesis 1: States Forming and Joining ICERD
The first hypothesis is that states would hesitate to join a convention unless a compelling
security concern existed; however, states may see participation as a means to interact with
other states and consolidate power, or states may simply jump on the bandwagon.
ICERD arrived after a series of declarations and conventions prohibiting racial discrimination. The Charter of the United Nations declared "human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (UN Charter). The most
important body for law on racial discrimination within the UN was the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. This was established by the Commission on Human Rights in 1947, "to undertake studies, particularly in the light of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and to make recommendations to the Commission on Human
Rights concerning the prevention of discrimination of any kind" (Santa Cruz 1977,35). Notably,
there already existed two conventions concerning discrimination in employment and education discrimination. The UN was not treading on new ground; it was merely expanding the
already existing body of human rights treaties.
The sub-commission's work received a higher place on the agenda during the winter
of 1959; this will sound commonsensical, but ICERD would arguably never have come into
being without acts of negative discrimination. In West Germany and other places around the
world, certain groups had attacked Jewish sites. This anti-Semitism alarmed the international
community (Banton 1996,53). Others referred to this as an "epidemic of swastika-painting and
other forms of racial and national hatred and religious and racial prejudices ofa similar nature."
The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities happened
to be in session in January of that year and condemned the acts, later composing factual data to
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for analysis. It recommended an instrument to "impose specific legal obligations on the parties
to prohibit manifestations of racial and national hatreds" (Schwelb 1966. 997-R).
The idea that discrimination is reproachable can be traced at least as far back as the
Enlightenment. This paper began with a quote from Locke that discussed mostly religious
intolerance but touched on what might be called racial intolerance as well. The dissemination
of these ideas led various governments to condemn and outlaw slavery. Then. the victors of
World War I imposed various standards for how the nations carved out ofthe Austro-Hungarian
Empire should treat minorities.
During World War II, Nazi Germany showed that racial discrimination begins with
exclusion and ends in extermination. Genocide became a crime, and the international
community realized that discrimination is the seed for it. Anti-Semitic acts. then. performed
so elose to the end of the war, told the world that discrimination would not just disappear;
people of their own accord would not give up these potent ideas, and members of the
United Nations realized that there ought to be national laws prohibiting some or all forms
of racial discrimination. Future conflict could destabilize the postwar system. and states saw
international action against racial discrimination as a means to prevent future conflict. Thus.
the introduction of the treaty to the agenda is in linc with realist predictions about sccurity.
In fact. ICERD's preface uscd both the word "security" and thc phrase "all necessary
means." That racial discrimination and mistreatment of minorities has been a kcy propagator of
conflict has been affirmed by various conflicts during both world wars and time and again over
the last half century. ICERD offers valuable help and advice for responsible states attempting
to deal with these problems.
One author warned that states should be acutely aware of the social costs of racial
discrimination in all fonns, in private as well as public settings (Mcron 19R5, 294). The social
exclusion of a group may lead to political unrest. extremism, and riots; often those without
political means of redress consider violence as the next best option. Considering such costs.
states would wisely make anti-discrimination law a matter of national security.
After the postwar acts of anti-Semitism, African states in the UN General Assembly
(GA) demanded a convention. Some in the GA wanted a convention that considered both
racial and religious discrimination (Banton 1996, 54). Apparently, Arab state delegates did
not want a mention of religion in the convention because of the nature of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Eastern Europe did not consider religion as important as race. Schwelb argued that
"political undercurrents" favored the racial question, and states agreed to make a convention
considering religious discrimination separately (1966. 999). Interestingly. it does not appear
that the stronger, more powerful Western states were responsible for the initial push for the
convention; however, smaller states' action openly is to some degree a sign of attempts to take
a greater position on the international stage.
Schwelb mentioned that most states did not want the convention to be an organ of the UN.
wanting instead states' parties to be accountable only to one another (1966, 1035). As a largely
independent organ, the convention is like a horizontal self-help organization, like Alcoholics
Anonymous, where people willingly subject themselves to a kind of monitoring with an eye
on the potential benefits of membership and a desire to change. Pressurc from other states that
join may convince a state that to remain influential in the international community, it must
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adopt international nonns; jumping on the bandwagon enthusiastically may win friends.
While the theoretical links are logical, the extent to which states were in fact motivated
by security concerns is unclear. Banton argued that many states did not really understand
racial discrimination as defined by the convention (1996). The treaty itself looks at racial
discrimination as a crime, but many states referred to it instead as a sickness; this definition
implies no one is held responsible. The Soviets, believing they had created a perfect socialist
society, believed racism to be a natural extension of capitalism and imperialism. Also, former
colonies spoke against colonialism, believing they had suffered from discrimination but would
not need to act against it in their own states. Perhaps states saw the convention as a way to
get back at capitalists and former colonial masters without imposing any great obligations on
themselves. There is some evidence of this as some states have later refused to make great
adjustments in national laws and deny the existence of discrimination in their countries.
In fact, only the United Kingdom is mentioned as publicly admitting discrimination. States
like the UK held that racial discrimination would exist anywhere race was a distinction; laws
might limit its effects, but the discrimination would always exist (Banton 1996, 58-9). The UK
also held a unique view on another related point. Instead of using the phrase, "prohibit and bring
to an end" [ICERD Article 2 (1 d)], it wanted to say, "with the purpose of bringing to an end." The
Netherlands and Turkey proposed a mild compromise, and Ghana offered the phrase "required
by circumstances." Apparently, some countries believed this phrase meant that states would be
exempt from enacting new laws if no discrimination existed (Schwelb 1966, 1017).
It is arguable, then, that there was no consensus on the nature of discrimination and the
expectations for states' parties. One of Banton's most important insights was as follows:
"The belief that racial discrimination could be eliminated ... mobilized governments in pursuit
of a higher objective ... without [which] they would never have committed themselves as they
did" (1996, 50). Some evidence supports that states thought they could sign the convention
and not change any national laws; however, most states did understand the treaty and the
concept of discrimination; "the travaux prcparatoires reveal that governments were well aware
of the far-reaching and mandatory nature of [the convention]" (Mahalic and Mahalic 1987,
88). Schwelb concurred, saying that many newly independent states participated actively and
significantly in the convention (1966, 1057). To summarize, this evidence suggests that states
were involved in the convention formation, but many did not intend to change national laws.
If states anticipated great security benefits, the benefits would have had to come from changes
in other countries and not in their own states. Arguably, though, the great powers knew about
the potential security'benefits, or suggestions by smaller states for the convention would never
have been seriously considered.
Realist predictions about the polarity of the debate are difficult to determine; realists predict
that U.S. and Soviet camps would arise. One example illustrates the alignment on one issue.
The U.S. and Brazil together proposed that a specific mention of anti-Semitism be included
in the convention (Banton 1996,60-61), and Austria, Poland, and Ecuador agreed. There was
some disagreement about whether anti-Semitism qualified as racial or religious discrimination.
The Afro-Asian delegates held that the convention already covered anti-Semitism and that no
mention was neccssary (Greece, France, Sudan, Jamaica, Italy, Nigeria, Pakistan, Lebanon,
iran, India, Jordan, Trinidad and Tobago, Zambia, Panama, Ecuador, Uganda, Ethiopia, and
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Guatemala agreed). Belgium thought leaving out anti-Semitism somehow limited the treaty.
There was a general agreement that anti-Semitism did fall under the deflnition of racial, not
just religious, discrimination, because even non-practicing Jews experienced it. The USSR
agreed that anti-Semitism was a fonn of racial discrimination (Schwelb 1966, 1014). Again.
this agreement is not consistent with realist predictions about polarity but may be consistent
with a prediction that the U.S. and the Soviet Union may behave similarly.
To conclude this section, it seems that the majority of statcs were not overly concerned
about security, though many states participated enthusiastically, as if to gain power or to jump
on the bandwagon. The bipolar nature of the debate is difficult to detennine. though the fact
that the convention passed a unanimous vote docs not seem to coincide with this hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: Convention Will Allow Noncommittal Membership
Realists hold states would want to remain relatively noncommitted to a treaty, allowing
themselves to pull out should compliance become too costly. Language in the treaty would
be vague, with standards difficult to measure and easy to avoid. Perhaps the best test for this
comes in Article (4). The reaction of states to this burdensome demand will provide useful
infonnation for the test of realism.
The U.S. and other Western states expressed concern about Article (4b), which called for
state's parties to "prohibit organizations which incite discrimination and make participation in
them punishable by law." The West saw potential conflicts with freedoms of association and
speech, though it chose not to pursue the debate and counted on being able to make reservations
(Banton 1996,62). The Third Committee omitted the part about reservations by a small number
of votes, but the General Assembly put it back into the convention. Schwelb commented "the
[resulting] provision is rather liberal and goes far in the direction of flexibility in the matter of
reservations" (1966, 1055-6). Schwelb also called ICERD a maximalist document; the goals.
aims, and speeiflcations could lead to drastic changes, but the lenient reservations would allow
the West to become a part of the treaty (1058) and likely limit its impact.
Many states have indeed made reservations. The U.S. delegate said the following when
voting for the convention: 2
Here in this Assembly I wish to state that the United States understands Article 4 of the
convention as imposing no obligation on any party to take measures which are not fully
consistent with its constitutional guarantees of freedom, including freedom of speech
and association. This interpretation is entirely consistent with the opening paragraph of
Article 4 of the convention itself, which provides that in carrying out certain obligations
of the convention, States Parties shall have due regard to the principles embodied in the
UNDHR and the rights expressly set forth in Article 5. 3
-American Journal oj1nternational LOll'
The UK tended to agree that Article (4) was impossible to implement (Sehwelb 1966,
1025). ICERD, however, has emphasized the need to eliminate not only acts of discrimination
but also the roots of discrimination, namely "prejudices and objective socio-economic
conditions." This is the likely objective of Article (4), which requires the criminalization of the
act of spreading racist ideas. Part of the problem with this is that an act not subversive to U.S.
law and order may be quite dangerous in another country without the same legal and social
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controls and nonns (Meron 1985,297-9). Apparently, some Western states have defended the
rights to freedom of speech and association over the right to not be discriminated against.
Since the convention entered into force, debate about these rights has continued among
committee homes. The positions of significant actors are outlined below (Meron 1985, 30 I):
UK: Article (4) dissemination clauses should be carried only out with full respect for
rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Belgium: Laws must be in full compliance with Article (4), while at the same time
allowing freedom of expression and association.
U.S.: "[Limit] the scope of the obligations assumed under the convention to those
which would not restrict the right of free speech as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution
and those which would not restrict the right of free speech as guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution and laws of the United States."
West Gennany: "After careful consideration, [Gennany] has reached the conclusion
that dissemination of opinions of racial superiority should be punishable if it was
intended to create racial discrimination or hatred."
States having their own separate interpretations of the most far-reaching and controversial
clauses of the treaty would be consistent with realist expectations. However, at one point the
Secretary General intervened and drafted the "Model Law Against Racial Discrimination,"
clarifying what kind of laws states ought to have to be in compliance. 4 Since then, states
including Italy, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Croatia, and Spain are among countries
that have modified laws to be more in compliance with this interpretation of Article (4). Even
the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case Wisconsin vs. Mitchell, ruled that tougher sentencing for
racially motivated crimes is constitutional (Lerner 1996).
That the Secretary General had to step in and clarify the meaning of Article (4) is evidence
that the committee has not conclusively handled some of the more difficult issues on its own;
the positive reaction of states, though, is more than realists would predict. As far as the level
of commitment to the treaty is concerned, debate about Article (4), as well as different views
concerning the right to discriminate privately, has largely been unresolved. It is clear from
reservations and statements that states have their own interpretations, and while the committee
has also attempted to rule on these matters, states made sure before agreeing to the convention
that they would have an escape clause.

Hypothesis 3: Enforcement Conditional on State Involvement
The third hypothesis is that the strength of the enforcement mechanism would be
conditional on the involvement of state's parties. Thus, lCERD should have little power
independently. There is conflicting evidence that the committee is both relatively weak and
that it has expanded its powers and influence. A weak committee would be unable to coerce
states to comply with the treaty obligations.
According to Part II of the convention, a committee is to be composed of "eighteen
experts of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality elected by States Parties
from among their nationals" (Article 8: I). Members of the committee do not serve as state
representatives but are nonetheless more closely associated with their states than other
committee IGOs; a given representative may only be nominated by his or her state because
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states cannot nominate other nationals. Also, ICERD specialists are compensated by their
respective states for services (Schwelb 1966, 1033). This would makc ICERD more subject
to state preferences and politics, arguably weakening the committce as a whole and allowing
states more power.
State's parties are required to submit a "report on the legislative, judicial, administrative
or other measures which they have adopted" (Article 9: I) within one year of entry into force
and then every two years; this gives the committee time to analyze reports and to request more
infonnation. Reporting is the main instrument for monitoring and enforcement.
Schwelb called reporting "a measure of implementation which is more acceptable to
governments than judicial proceedings and arrangements for the quasi-judicial settlement
of complaints. In certain contexts it has proved very useful and effective" (1966, 1034). In
its work, the committee as a whole cannot consider outside documents, though individuals
on the committee are not restricted in the kinds of information they may accumulate (Prado
1985,499).
The committee itself submits reports to the General Assembly. Some wanted the
committee strictly linked to state's parties, others wanted it to be a UN organ. Italy proposed a
compromise inherent in the treaty: principles in ICERD apply to all member states of the UN,
but the obligations are only binding on state's parties to convention (Prado 1985,498).
While realists may question the power of reporting, the committee has since been effective
and expansive with the reporting system. In the sixth session, the committee decided to invite
a representative of state's parties to defend and explain reports (Santa Cruz 1977, 37-9). In the
seventh session, the committee asked to know more about Article (4), which requires states
to make certain acts criminal offenses. The committee requested that states report on specific
laws that had been passed or on what laws already existed (Santa Cruz 1977,39). This shows
that ICERD has since actively engaged state's parties, probably realizing that states were not
certain about what to report on. In this way, ICERD can make recommendations on reporting
procedures, which then become standard for all state's parties. Also, ICERD has had states
report on matters of noncompliance.
Almost by default then, ICERD can interpret the convention and make additional
demands; State's parties mayor may not accept them, but because ICERD considers the
reports, it has some sway in how states are required to implement convention obligations
(Meron 1985, 285).
Success through reporting has been mixed. The committee asserted, "Legislation
in accordance with Article 2( I d) is mandatory for all States Parties regardless of their
circumstances." And while "discussions with the committee have been instrumental in the
enactment of specific legislation prohibiting racial discrimination by some sixty States Parties,
... some twenty-five States Parties maintain that no specific legislation on racial discrimination
is required under [this article 1because racial discrimination does not exist in their territories"
(Mahalic and Mahalic 1987, 85-8).
Realists also predict that the committee may become politicized and fragmented.
Schwelb admitted to this possibility, arguing that as an institution the committee may form
its own interests or become a forum for disagreement between factions. Mr. Dechezelles, a
particularly outspoken committee member nominated by France, illustrated this potential. Of
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a Belarusian report, he said "[I am] skeptical of statements claiming that in whole continents,
or at least in a very large area of the world, not a single case of racial discrimination had been
brought before the courts because racial discrimination had completely disappeared among
the population." Another committee member, Mr. Sviridov, later commented: "[racially
discriminatory] practices [do] not exist in socialist countries," adding that he, "could not
agree ... that racism was an inherent evil in every man" (Banton 1996, 124). This example
shows that a fractioned committee would likely give mixed signals to states' parties and
prevent an effective approach. Such disintegration is consistent with realist predictions,
though in light of the benefits to security, states may be more inclined to cooperate. Clearly,
the polarization of the international system is evident in this anecdote.
Another author stated contrarily in 1985 that ICERD based its actions more and more
on a group of formal guidelines (Prado, 507). While I have no evidence of this, I would
comfortably predict that with the spread of capitalism and democracy, states that formerly
denied the existence of racial discrimination would be more willing to work with the committee
to recognize and correct it.
In addition to reporting, the convention allows states to monitor one another and alert
ICERD to violations. Article (12) allows for an ad hoc Conciliation Commission composed of
five members. Appointed by "unanimous consent" of parties involved, this commission then
adopts its own rules. According to Article (13), the commission submits a report about the
facts and recommendations, then the committee chairman gives it to the states, and after three
months the states accept or decline. s The convention makes no other mention of this process,
which is not strong: these conciliatory commissions can issue nothing legally binding. This
conciliation process is consistent with realist predictions; a powerful process would result in a
legally binding, enforceable decision.
In summary, the second prediction of realists, that the treaty would be non-binding in
nature with weak enforcement features, is mostly consistent. The treaty has as its primary
instrument a reporting mechanism and has no capacity to issue binding disputes. As shown
above, the committee has not historically presented a unified face, though it may increasingly
do so in the future. Also, the biggest problem with reporting is when states either do not report
at all or take too long to submit reports (Prado 1985, 493). However, through the dialogue
allowed by the reporting process, the committee has effectively helped states pass more
meaningful and effective national laws against racial discrimination. In this regard, reporting
may be an influential tool. This principle seems to be in line with theories about soft power:
a committee to hold ~tates accountable even through just dialogue can bring about change. It
is also clear that while the committee members have disagreed, the work of the committee is
carried out largely without a great deal of outside influence. In this regard, ICERD may be
taking on a more independent role than realists would have predicted.

Hypothesis 4: Limited Success and Inability to Change Structures
The fourth and final hypothesis is that ICERD would not dramatically change either
internal or external affairs and its accomplishments would be limited.
Mahalic (1987, 101) stated, "It is noteworthy that the combined efforts of the committee
and States Parties ... have clarified misconceptions, fostered more consistent interpretations
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of the convention, and resulted in a greater degree of compliance with its provisions by a
majority of States Parties." Banton added to this positive assessment with two of the
committee's achievements: first, states have much better laws; and second, the committee is
now established, autonomous, and generally not political ( 1996, 8-10).
Concerning the potential efficacy of a then newly formed treaty, Heman Santa Cruz reported
that states have adopted a "great variety of measures," some legislative and some constitutional,
to pursue the ends of the treaty. He also gave an exhaustive list of various bans on discrimination
in many constitutions (1977,49). Cruz suggested that the treaty prompted a rush to bring national
laws against anti-discrimination in line with ICERD demands. In one way, the direct cause and
effect is irrelevant; a convention such as ICERD draws attention to a matter when states arc
challenged to sign and ratify. This is one way the UN and other international organizations
influence state behavior, somewhat like an interest group would lobby.
While ICERD may be effective, there are numerous examples of persistent, intense
discrimination in member states. Three examples of such discrimination follow:
I. Caste discrimination has arguably been one area of failure for ICERD and other UN
Human Rights bodies. There has been a failure to define, research, and actively pursue
policies against this; there is even debate about whether or not caste discrimination
qualifies as a form of racial discrimination. UN action is referred to as "a story of selective
perception, tepid reactions and token gestures" (The Hindu 200 I).
2. The Bangladeshi constitution declares that the state shall not discriminate against
any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Bangladesh is an
ICERD member; ICERD has ordered that the constitutional provision is not enough.
However, Bangladesh has yet to pass specific laws criminalizing discrimination, and
Bangladesh itself continues to discriminate. For example, the Jumma people do not
receive equal rations and have not received previously confiscated land back. This is a
case of discrimination against a group of indigenous people (Asian Centre for Human
Rights 2008).6
3. Japan has argued about the term "national origin" since 1946. It believes that the
term is nothing akin to race or ethnicity. Instead, "the term ... should mean the legal
nationality one had before migrating from one country to another, or before naturalizing
in a country in which one was born an alien" (Weatherall 2007).
Paul Roth of the University of Otago called the main method to encourage compliance
"naming and shaming." Roth reported a more positive case with New Zealand, when ICERD
expressed a number of concerns about a particular law and made recommendations, requesting
that New Zealand include an update in the next report. Roth congratulated ICERD for what he
called constructive dialogue, though he lamented some of the consequences of New Zealand
being called down. First, New Zealand had a nearly flawless human rights record. Second,
ICERD will be looking closely at New Zealand for the indefinite future. Third, other treaty
bodies will also look into the issue. New Zealand later reported on the implementation of the
law (ICERD 2007). For states like New Zealand, which cares about its human rights record,
the opinion of the international community matters, and this is an incentive to comply and
avoid scrutiny.
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Two references to expert opinions, one ofthem quite dated, and four anecdotes are mostly
inconclusive about the fourth hypothesis. ICERD has not drastically changed the structure
of the international system, though it appears that on the national level many states have
adjusted old laws and passed new ones in attempts to comply with the treaty. It is also clear
that discrimination will remain pertinent.

Conclusion
Article (55) of the UN Charter states that the UN is to work for "universal respect for, and
observance ot~ human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion" (Banton 1996,21). The UN has taken that mandate to form ICERD,
to which many states are now a party. This paper has given four separate realist hypotheses
concerning an anti-discrimination convention and tested them, which test has produced mixed
results; some cases were more conclusive than others. ICERD seems to be a relatively weak
body, yet it has still influenced national laws and state actions. While full compliance to this
convention may never be attainable due to the nature of racial discrimination, it can be concluded
that ICERD has been at least partially successful in helping the UN fulfill its mandate without
distinction. Given the security implications involved, realist predictions are more accurate
than I would have expected. A more thorough study would likely include a detailed analysis of
reservations, national laws, and the evolution ofintemational attitudes towards minorities.
NOTES
I. Interestingly, this debate about the origins of authority surfaces in another form in the various views
defining human rights. The Soviet Union commonly held that there are no rights without a powerful
state, while the West claimed human rights exist independent of a state and can act against a state.
2.

The reservation lodged upon ratification also discusses article four, as well as the overall respect for
privacy that the constitution promises.

3.

Article (5) states that the rights of freedom and expression are to be granted without distinction.

4.

The draft law states: I) it shall be an offence to threaten, insult, ridicule or otherwise abuse a person
or group of persons with words or behavior that may be interpreted as an attempt to cause racial
discrimination or racial hatred, and 2) it shall be an offence to defame an individual or group of
individuals on racial grounds. Organizations that violate these restrictions should be declared illegal
and prohibited.

5.

Banton reports that no state has ever gone through this commission process. That may be because
most states resolve violations through negotiations.

6.

I have chosen not to include any in-depth discussion of the treatment of minorities or selt~determination
in this paper.
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Explaining the Implementation of
CEDAW: A Quantitative Study of
151 Countries
Jessica Ray

Abstract
The :,phere of women s rights presents a unique challenge to improving the protection of
human rights throughout the world. The difficulty surrounding the implementation olwomen 5'
rights treaties may large~v be attributed to the complexity of reconstructing international
norms so that they jail in line with current local norms that perpetuate women s derogatory
status. My quantitative stU((v of 151 countries shows that "dissonant" states (i.e., states
whose local views and treatment olwomen conflict with international norms) are less likely to
implement the Convention on the Elimination ojAll Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW). Polic),makers need to look jiJr other ways, in addition to international treaties,
if they want to improve the status of lVomen in these states. Statistical analysis also shows
a strong correlation between economic development and CEDAWs implementation. Future
research can strive jiJr more valid measures of local actors and NCOs, bringing us closer to
understanding how to improve the lives of women.
Introduction
Within the past fifty years, the international human rights campaign has grown significantly,
both in the number of its participants and in the contextual breadth of its declarations. However,
scholars still debate if international human rights norms actually lead to greater women's rights
protection. The forefront of their disagreement is the implementation of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW holds a secular,
Western view of women, which comes into direct conflict with more religious, non-Western
views of women. Because of this contention surrounding international women's rights norms,
states face ever-increasing challenges as they proceed to interpret and implement them.
Previous research shows that CEDAW's ratification has led to improved outcomes for
women, but the progress has been slow and varies from state to state (Gray, Kittilson, and
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Sandholtz 2006). If states arc willing to ratify treaties on the rights of women, what factors
prevent them from implcmenting those treaties at the same rate') Furthermore. do international
women's rights treaties improve women's rights in states where domestic norms do not coincide
with international ideals? If not, can culturally and religiously dissonant states reconcile
opposing views without completely adapting to Western, secular views of women 's rights? In
answering these questions, I hypothesize that I) states whose local norms are dissonant with
international norms arc less likely to implement CEDAW. and 2) local factors have a greater
impact than international factors on the implementation of CEDAW in states with dissonant
local norms.
In studying the implementation of human rights norms, CEDAW is an important case
study for two reasons. First, women's rights are diffieult to implement. No region in the world
provides women the same legal, social, and economic rights as men (Weiss 2003, 582). By
studying the most difficult type of human rights implementation. it will be easier to apply
the findings to other realms of human rights treaties. Second. improving the lives of women
improves society in general. If a woman is physically, cmotionally. and economically secure.
she will positively impact her family and her community. For example. educating the young
women of a country will improve the mortality rate. decrease the fertility rates. and positively
impact the health and education prospects for the next generation (World Bank 2004). Finding
what factors influence CEDAW's implementation potentially has worldwide effects.
The convention requires that all states' parties review their existing laws on women. change
laws that discriminate against women, and submit periodic reports to the convention's committee.
Article 3 of the treaty best summarizes CEDAW's fundamental nature:
States Parties shall take in all fields. in particular in the political. social. economic
and cultural fields. all appropriate measures. including legislation. to ensure the full
development and advancement of women. for the purpose of guaranteeing them the
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality
with men (United Nations 1981).
Although some treaty provisions conflict with widely held views of women and their
roles, especially in the Muslim world, treaty ratification has come rather easily. International
pressure led more than 90 percent of the UN's membership to ratify the treaty. As the global
women's movement strengthened toward the end of the twentieth century. international
norms demanded that states improve the condition of women (Weiss 2003, 582). Western
governments and international donors began to tie development assistance to human rights
records and were rcluctant to support states who did not commit to improving the treatment
ofwomcn. Ratification proved to be a valuable public relations move, keeping the state from
bcing a targct of international shame (Weiss 2003,583).
However, CEDAW's ratification not only requires that states align thcir domestic laws
with the provisions of the convention; it also compcls states to fully realize those treaty
provisions by implementing practical measures for womcn to access thc opportunitics. The
implementation stage is the most difficult. espccially whcn a state's local ideas, culture. and
religion do not necessarily support CEDAW's provisions, such as predominately Muslim
statcs. The most heavily debated issue is that of equality versus equity (Weiss 2003, 585). In
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many countries, equality refers to a Western concept in which men and women ought to have
the same treatment. Many other societies, however, believe that the distribution of power,
resources, and opportunities between men and women need only be equitable. For example,
one of the most controversial topics during the 1993 Vienna Human Rights Conference was
the debate over inheritance laws. Westerners argued for a resolution that would ensure equal
inheritance rights for sons and daughters, but representatives from other countries argued that
although inheritance specifically went to the son in their state, there were support mechanisms
built into society that provided benefits not measurable in terms of currency or land to the
daughter (Weiss 2003,585). The law was equitable but not equal. The debate about which value
is superior is the basis for the secular and religious divide that continues to hinder CEDAW's
implementation. Although nearly all UN member countries have ratified a universal treaty on
women's rights, each individual state must frame CEDAW's ideals in a way that is harmonious
with local religious and traditional values.

Theoretical Beginnings: Analyzing the Normative Discourse
Although current discourse on human rights norm formation and implementation offers
great insight into how international organizations create women's rights norms, it cannot fully
explain the variation in implementation because it fails to consider other factors that are unique
to women's rights. By recognizing the inherent differences between general human rights and
women's rights, theorists can more accurately explain why states ratify CEDAW, how and where
implementation occurs, and what factors could improve the global protection of women.
The process of CEDAW ratification-not implementation-is similar to the norm
emergence process described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). The authors illustrated a
three-stage process of norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm internalization. The first stage
explains that norms emerge when norm entrepreneurs persuade the international community
to accept a moral notion of appropriate or desirable behavior. Norm entrepreneurs must gain
the acceptance of key actors by competing against the existing constellation of norms in
order to reach the tipping point. At this point, usually one-third of states have accepted the
norm, and the second stage of norm cascade begins. In this stage, socialization takes root,
and states and transnational networks use peer pressure to bring other states into concurrence.
Finally, after the norm has become automatic, norm internalization begins: the norm becomes
natural, and advocates press for universal codification. Following this pattern, women's
rights advocates brought women's issues to the international stage, convincing the world of
their moral importance. More and more states committed to improving the status of women,
and eventually the norm was established in international treaties and declarations such as
CEDAW. States ratified the treaty as a way to conform to the international system, legitimize
their presence, and avoid shame. CEDAW's ratification clearly follows existing theories on
international pressure and global integration.
Unfortunately, the norm emergence process cannot explain why some states proceed to
implement the treaty successfully and others do not. The work of Risse and Sikkink (1999)
tried to explain how ideational forces improve states' human rights practices. They argued
that transnational advocacy networks, made up of local and international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), internationals organizations (lOs), and other states, aim to pressure
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states into implementing human rights norms. In the first phase. transnational actors target an
oppressive state by gathering information on its human rights practices and placing it on the
international agenda. After distributing information on human rights abuses. the transnational
actors persuade states to condemn the practices of the target state. In the second phase. the
target state responds by denying the charges and campaigning for domestic support. The third
phase begins as states pressure the target state into compliance by threatening the retraction of
economic and military aid and membership in the international community. At this point. the
state either concedes to the pressure and improves its practices. or it increases the oppression
of its people, thereby increasing domestic opposition and opening opportunities for regime
change. If the state concedes to the intcrnational pressurc and begins fo comply with and
validate human rights norms, it has entered the fourth stage. Once on this path. the state
eventually exhibits rule-consistent behavior, or the fifth stage ofthc spiral model.
Although these models effectivcly show how norm diffusion and socialization affect
human rights protection in oppressive statcs, they have a few weaknesses worth noting. First,
ncither adequately explains the process of norm internalization. Both approaches disregard the
effects of domestic political battles associated with treaty implementation and downplay
the extent to which the continued conversation between collective norms and local practices
redefines and alters the original norm, especially in the realm of women's rights (Zwingel
2005; van Kersbergen and Verbeck 2007).
The 1995 World Conference on Women well illustrates the controversial nature of
women's rights. Prior to this meeting, states reached a consensus on the reproductive and health
rights of women at the Conference on Population and Development in 1994. However. there
were extreme opponents to the consensus, including the Vatican and various Islamic states.
The 1995 meeting provided a forum in which opposing groups could express their viewpoints
on how to implement women's rights (Joachim 2003, 268; van Kersbergen and Verbeck 2007.
236). Risse and Sikkink focused on a one-dimensional view of how human rights nonns affect
thc identity and interests of states. However, states can have a more dynamic view of human
rights norms and their diffusion and implementation.
Additionally, the sphere of women's human rights norms prcsents different challenges
than human rights in general. Compared to an oppressive state torturing its citizens or refusing
freedom of the press, violations of women's human rights are usually deeply entrenched in
and facilitated by religious and cultural tradition. Oppression of women is usually the result
of a specific paradigm-not an effort to retain power. For example, the division between a
secular vision of women's rights and a religious view ofwomen's rights is highly contestedespccially in states whcrc various religious and cultural groups define marriagc and family
law. Thus far, the international discourse on women's rights has taken a secular and western
viewpoint, giving a hegemonic bias to international norm crcation that previous studies have
not addressed.
Even though Rissc and Sikkink offered a persuasive explanation of general human rights
implementation, they did not fully explain the variation in implemcntation ofwomen's human
rights. One variable that the authors ignored was how socialization influences implementation
of women's rights. States have different circles of influence. They care more about gaining
acceptance from friends than enemies-even when the enemy is the entire international
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system. Even though the international trend is to accept the norm, a regional trend to reject the
norm in the name of culture or religion may be more persuasive. When theorists consider these
factors, the explanation of women's rights norms and implementation is more accurate.
By connecting the theoretical progress of Risse and Sikkink with the separate factors of
women's rights, Susanne Zwingel presented a fuller explanation of women's rights and norm
implementation (2005). She argued that CEDAW's domestic implementation depends on three
factors: I) the degree to which domcstic institutions enable women to participate in public
policy formation, 2) the existcnce of transnational government and nongovernment action that
supports the implementation of international norms, and 3) the level of cultural acceptance
of the convention (408). With these three factors, Zwingel showed how implementation of
women's rights relies more heavily on domcstic factors than Risse and Sikkink's model.
An empirical test of Zwingel's explanation of women's rights norms leads to important
implications for women's rights.

Empirical Explanations
Authors Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz posed the question, "How do rising levels of
international interconnectedness affect the social, economic, and political conditions for
women?" (2006, 293). Their subsequent study hypothesized that cross-national exchange
improves the status of women. By analyzing both economic and ideational effects on
international interaction, the authors performed a quantitative study of 180 countries from
1975-2000, measuring the impact of globalization on women's life expectancy, literacy,
economic participation, and parliamentary participation. This study helps determine which
theories best explain CEDAW's implementation and where improvements may be made.
The authors tested whether "countries that are predisposed (for internal reasons) to
promote equality for women will both ratify CEDAW and show more favorable outcomes on
the dependent variables" (322). They found that high trade levels and CEDAW ratification
without reservations had a positive effect on female life expectancy and literacy. And
although CEDAW ratification did not affect the number of women serving in parliament
among democracies, it did correlate with a greater female percentage in the labor force and
parliament in non-democracies-even when CEDAW was passed with reservations. These
results refute the notion that ratification and positive levels of women's equality were both
products of underlying factors (326). However, test results did show that religion played a
major part in both CEDAW's ratification and levels of illiteracy among women. For example,
predominately CathDlic countries had lower levels of female illiteracy and were more likely
to ratify CEDAW, whereas predominately Islamic countries had higher levels of illiteracy and
were far less likely to ratify CEDAW. The authors concluded that participation in international
organizations and treaties can change institutions, which in tum may alter culture in favor of
protecting women's rights.
However, the authors' connection between international institutions and cultural change
was weak. Their study did not account for the possibility of transnational interaction in the
form of nongovernmental organizations. As argued by Zwingel, transnational government and
nongovernment activism may affect the protection of women's rights. This effect cannot be
measured by trade, foreign direct investment, membership in the UN and the World Bank,
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or ratification of CEDAW (all the global interaction variables). Furthermore, the study
assumed that domestic and international women's groups and organizations are empowered
by the diffusion of gender equality norms initiated by international treaties and declarations.
However, there is a possibility that the actual relationship between women's movements
and international discourse is reciprocal in nature-both entities continue to influence and
strengthen one another. Again, the study did not test for this possibility, and the question of
NGO influence remains unanswered.
Moreover, the failure to account for variables of international interaction could explain
why the authors did not show that certain states are predisposed to both better gender equality
and treaty ratification. The article's theoretical discoursc concluded that states that are
"more open to the international system in terms of greater movement of goods and services
across borders" (3 17) are more likely to support women's rights. However, economic factors
also influence the level to which states interact ideationally in the intcrnational system:
not only do goods and services cross borders, but so do ideas-especially in the form of
international nongovernmental organizations. Although Gray. Kittilson, and Sandholtz
(2006) showed that CEDAW's ratification is an important factor in the improvement of
women's rights, their study did not illustrate the importance of transnational interaction
specific to women's rights or the level to which diffcrent states valuc that interaction. We
must ask how international women's rights norms can be reconciled with culturally or
religiously dissonant communities.

The Importance of Local Factors in Dissonant States
The previous studies portrayed implementation as complete acceptance or complete
rejection of the international human rights norm. However. Acharya proposed a different view
of implementation that included local agents framing and reconstructing foreign norms to
ensure that norms fit with the local identity and culture (2004). Even though international
actors may "teach" women's rights norms to states, the reception of the norm depends on
domestic political, religious, and cultural factors (2004, 243). In this process of reconstructing
the international norm to make it congruent with local norms, the role of local actors is more
important than the role of outside actors (2004, 244).
In relation to CEDAW's implementation, it is likely that both international and local
factors affect implementation at the domestic level. However, it is also possible that one factor
becomes more influential in certain cases. I hypothesizc that local factors havc a greater impact
than international factors in states where local norms and values concerning women dispute
the international norms outlined by the convention. In a state where the domestic values
concerning the status of women contradict CEDAW's international values, the state will face
strong domestic opposition from political, cultural, and religious leaders who do not want to
change the current way oflife. They strongly reject change bccause it has far-reaching cultural,
social, political, and economic effects. Anti- Wcstcrn sentiments and opposition intensify
because they see CEDAW as a secular document. Therefore, the voices of transnational actors
will be less effective, and possibly harmful, because the state sees CEDAW as imposing a
Western ideal on a non-Western culture and because the actors will be less qualified to frame
the ideal in a way that does not contest domestic culture. However, local factors in the form
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of women's political empowerment and domestic women's groups can frame and reconstruct
CEDAW's provisions so that they fall in line with national values.
The most important local factors to CEDAW's domestic implementation are the level to
which women are represented in government and economic institutions, the level to which
the government supports and cooperates with grassroots women's rights movements, and the
level of congruence between international norms and local norms. While trying to implement
CEDAW, states could face great barriers such as rigid institutions or deeply rooted cultural
values that oppose the norm. However, if women are represented politically and economically,
there will be more opportunities for advocates to frame or restructure CEDAW's provisions
to fit with local norms. Similarly, if a state supports and encourages domestic groups that
advocate CEDAW's implementation, then more resources will be devoted to their work. Most
importantly, however, if a state's local norms arc easily associated with international norms,
implementation will be easier. On the other hand, the further removed a state's local norms
are from CEDAW's essence, the more difficult it is for local actors to frame the norm in a
harmonious way, and the more important their work becomes.

Case Study of Pakistan
Although the purpose of this research is to show quantitatively that local factors are
more influential in the implementation ofCEDAW in dissonant states, a qualitative example
helps illustrate the challengc of achieving women's rights in Muslim countries. Pakistan's
efforts to implement CEDAW show how the engendering of Muslim civil society poses a
challenge to international norm diffusion (Weiss 2003, 581 ).
Pakistan's current legal structure, a result of Zia ul-Haq's 1979 Islamization program,
places women in an unequal position to men (583). According to the WomanStats multivariate
scale measuring CEDAW's implementation, there is virtually no enforcement of laws
consonant with CEDAW in Pakistan, or such laws do not exist (WomanStats 2007). Pakistan's
report to CEDAW's commission states that, unfortunately, laws and customs derogatory to
women are "justified in the name of Islam or have been introduced as Islamic laws when
clearly they arc retrograde customs and traditions, or ill-informed interpretations that bear no
relation to the divine design" (Weiss 2003, 587). Although Pakistan ratified CEDAW in 1996,
it warned that its adherence to the convention depcnded on the provisions in its constitution.
Simply ratifying CEDAW did not mean instant success for Pakistani women.
Today, Pakistan is struggling to construct culturally acceptable definitions of women's
rights and appropriate ways to implement them bccause it does not have and does not allow
an active local network to reconstruct thc norm. Although some elite women hold a presence
in Pakistani politics, women have generally been excluded from the political process. Longstanding traditional beliefs define women's roles within the home, and the proliferation of
religious schools exclude women from the public sphere, as well, denying them any source
of education or personal income. Additionally, various grassroots women's rights groups that
strive to raise the issues of domestic violence, women's political participation, and female
education are severely limited by the state. The central government "warns them not to
push it too far so as not to anger the various Islamist madras as now aspiring to have greater
influence over Islamic laws" (593). All three of the most important local factors contributing
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to CEDAW's succcssful implementation arc missing in Pakistan, illustrating the importance
of local factors in dissonant states.

Data Collection
Although Pakistan offers a poignant example of implcmentation in dissonant states,
a large-n, quantitative study was helpful in discovering what factors arc most influential in
causing states to implement CEDA W. By studying as many countrics as possible, I observed
maximum variation in both my independent and dependent variables and effectively controlled
for other factors contributing to CEDAW's implementation. This makes my findings more
generalizable and helps me avoid the selection bias inherent in qualitative case studies. I
limited my study to countries whose total population is over one million, which allowed me to
include lSI countries in my samplc. Because data concerning thc status of women, especially
in developing countries, is so difficult to gather, I chose to confine my study to data collected
between 2000 and 2006. Although the information docs not come from the same year, the
range is small enough that valid comparisons may be made.
In testing my hypothesis that local actors havc a greater impact on CEDAW's
implementation in dissonant statcs, I collected data about the variation in states' local norms
concerning the status of women. A dissonant state exhibited significant formal reservations to
CEDAW and limited the discussion of gender issues within society. I expected to see that the
overwhelmingly majority of states that are culturally dissonant to international women's rights
norms were Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist. It is important to note that most religious norms that
harm women are not necessarily due to the religion itself; howevcr, religious interpretation and
cultural practices associated with these three rcligions may condone gender inequalities. For
example, every Muslim country that has ratificd the treaty has stated that certain provisions of
the convention may be contradictory to tenets of Islam (Weiss 2003, 584). To test local norms
in my statistical analysis, I have chosen to opcrationalize dissonant statcs as countries in which
the majority of the population is Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist majorities. I found the religious
breakdown of each country using the Central Intclligence Agency's World Facthook (2007).
Religion is an overarching predictor of cultural and societal values, and, therefore, a valid
measure of the level to which a state's local norms are congruent with intcrnational norms.
Ifmy hypothesis is correct, states that are both dissonant and successful in implementing
CEDAW when all else is held constant should show several commonalities. First, NGOs
focused on women within the country will be largely domestic: grassroots level organizations
as opposed to organizations outside the state. If NGOs act more as international actors, then
their efforts will be less effective in a statc that does not value the international norm. Second,
within a dissonant state that exhibits a higher level of implementation, womcn will readily
participate in the political and economic arenas and partake in thc decision-making processes
of both. If the analysis demonstrates thesc implications, it would show that local factors are
more influential in dissonant states.
Regrettably, both of these implications proved difficult to measurc with thc time and
rcsources available. Ideally, I collected data measuring the level to which a statc's NGOs
were grassroots level organizations as opposed to international organizations; however, this
information was difficult to collect, and I could not find a comparable substitute. In addition,
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I hypothesized that intemationaI factors such as the lcvel to which a state values global
integration and the prcsence of intemational nongovemmental organizations (INGOs) within
the state should show no correlation with implementation levels in dissonant states. Because
local factors are the key to framing and reconstructing the intemational norm in a culturally
accepting way, these intemational factors do not affect CEDAW's implementation.
To test the effect of intemational factors on CEDAW implementation in dissonant states, I
operationalized global integration by measuring the amount of time a state has been a member
of the UN and the World Bank and measured its trade level. These measures are modeled
from a study by Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz. They theorized that the longer a eountry has
been a member of these intemational organizations, the more likely they are to absorb the
intemational women's rights norms promulgated by each organization (2006, 309). Gray,
Kittilson, and Sandholtz operationalized global integration by measuring the level to which
a country trades with others, with high levcls of trade implying that the country has more
investment in and interaction with the intemational system-and the women's rights norms
associated with it.
Lastly, I measured the number of INGOs present in each state. Because I could not test
whether local NGOs affect implementation, it was especially important to find evidence that
intemational actors do not affect implementation in dissonant states.
In terms of my second implication, women's political and economic decision-making
power, the UN's Human Development Report's Gender Empowerment Measure indexes the
inequality between men's and women's political and economic opportunities. This information
was available for eighty-four countries. For the other countries in my sample, I measured the
percentage of women in govemment at the ministerial level. Although this does not specifically
represent the level to which women have decision-making power in the political and economic
realms, I can assume that the more women there are in govemment, the more women there are
that have decision-making power overall.
It is important to note that there are several other factors that contribute to the status
of women around the world. For example, I assumed that lesser developed countries would
have fewer protections for women's rights due to the nature of poverty and the resources
available to the state. Additionally, regime type has been shown to affeet the protection
of human rights. I also expected that more populous countries would have a harder time
controlling human rights practices and that countries in the midst of conflict are subject to an
increase in human rights abuses. Therefore, I have included control variables for economic
development, regime type, size of country, and conflict. These controls are based on those
used by Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz (2006) and Landman (2005). These controls, along
with the rest of the variables, are outlined in Table I.
Defining Implementation of CEDAW
Within the context of my research, I defined CEDAW's implementation as the level to
which a state's laws are consistent with CEDAW, if those laws are enforced, and how much
the govemment prioritizes enforcement. To measure implementation, I used the Scale of the
Degree of Discrepancy between Law and Practice on Issues Conceming Women in Society
(WomanStats Codebook 2007). The scale examines three sub-clusters, including physical
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Dependent Variable
Level to which a state's laws and
WomanStats Database 2007
practice arc consonant with
continuous scale 0 to 4 with 0 meaning
high implementation and 4 meaning

CEDAW

Implementation

low implementation

Independent Variables
Intemational Actors

UN/World
Bank Years
Trade Ratio

INGOs
Local Actors

Dissonance

Womcn's Political
Participation
Muslim, Hindu, and
Buddhist States

Collective years of membership in the
UN and the World bank
Natural log of a state's total imports
plus total exports divided by GDP
(Gray, Kittilson, and SandholtL 20(6)
Natural log ofthc number oflNGOs
registered in each state
Percentage of women in

World Bank 2007/UN 2007
World Bank 2006

Landman 2005
UN HDR 2007

ministerial positions
States in which the majority of the
population is Muslim, Hindu, or
Buddhist (dichotomous)

CIA World Faetbook 2007

States which were in a civil war

Landman 2005

Cantral Variables
Conflict

in 2000 (dichotomous)
Scale 10 to + I 0
Natural log ofGDP Per Capita in
US dollars
Natural log of population of country

Democracy
Economic Development
Size

Polity IV
CIA World Factbook 2007
World Bank 2006

in thousands

______________
T_ab_l_e_2: Implementation Scale _ _ __
Score

Definition
'The laws are consonant with CEDAW and arc well enforced; such cnforcement is a high priority of the
government."

"The laws are consonant with CEDAW; these are mostly enforced, and the government appears to be
fairly proactive in challenging cultural nonns which harm \vomen."
"Thc laws arc consonant with CEDAW, but therc is spotty enforccmcnt~ the governmcnt mayor may
not signal its intcrest in challenging cultural nonns hannful to women."
"Laws are for the most part consonant with CEDAW, with little effective enforcement; improving the
situation of women appears to bc a low priority for thc government."

"There is virtually no enforcement of laws consonant with CEDAW. or such laws do not evcn exist."
'" All dcnlll\10m. taken from Hudson. el al., 2007

security and bodily integrity, education, and family freedom. The original scale ranges from
zero to four with zero being high implementation; however, for ease in interpreting quantitative
results, I have inversed the scale, and the resulting breakdown is outlined in Table 2.
Because data concerning the status of women is difficult to gather, especially in countries
whose treatment of women falls below the international standard, the validity of some of the
measures within my quantitative analysis is less than ideal. The multivariate scale measuring
the law and practice of each state is missing values for twenty-five countries out of my dataset
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of 150 countries. To compensate for thc missing values, I cntered in values for another, similar
multivariate scalc measuring the discrepancy between law and practice concerning women's
physical security. This measure correlates with the original multivariate scale 70.3 pcrcent of the
time. Although not a pcrfect substitute, using the physical security scale allows me to continue
with the study without having to wait for the compilation of more complete data.

Criteria for Verification
After statistical analysis of the above implications, I will conclude that my theory is
correct only if the data meets the following criteria. First, I will conclude that norm dissonance
negatively affects CEDAW's implementation if I find that the implementation lcvels of
congruent states are 20 pcrcent higher than those of dissonant state. I will only accept this
criteria ifthc difference is statistically significant as wcll. I will conclude that norm congruence
does not atTect implementation if the difference is less than 10 percent or is not statistically
significant at the 0.05 lcvel.
Second, I will conclude that local actors have a greater impact on implementation in
incongruent states ifthc measure of women's political participation, when interacted with the
variables for dissonance, shows at least a 10 percent difference in implementation between
dissonant and congruent states. Similarly, I will only accept this criteria if the variables
prove statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, if the ditTerence in implementation
atTected by local actors is less than 5 percent, I will conclude that local actors are not any more
influential in implementing CEDA W in dissonant states than in congruent states. Overall, the
variables measuring the effect oflocal factors were most affected by missing data; therefore, I
will be cautious in approaching the results of this statistical analysis.
Third, I will conclude that international factors are no less influential than local factors if
I find that UN/World Bank membership, trade levels, or presence of INGOs show a 10 percent
ditTerence in implementation levels between dissonant and congruent states. If any of these
variables show a 10 percent ditTerence in implementation that is significant at the 0.05 level,
then the data will show that international actors do have an impact in dissonant states and
that my second hypothesis is incorrect. However, if none of the variables show a significant
difference in implementation levels, then the data will show that international actors have no
more influence in implementation than local actors.
If my analysis meets these criteria, I will be confident that there is a correlation between
local actors and CEDAW implementation in incongruent states. However, these measures
will not fully show'that the influence of local actors actually causes greater implementation.
Nevertheless, I feel that correlation in itself will be a significant finding and leave it to future
qualitative research to test the causation between local actors and implementation of women's
rights norms.
Methods and Results
To test my first hypothesis that dissonant states are less likely to implement CEDAW,
I ran a linear regression of all variables to see if there was a significant difference between
dissonant states and congruent states in the level of implementation. The results from this
regression are outlined in Table 3. The regression shows that economic development, as
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Table 3: Implementation ofCEDAW

Table 4: Implementation of CEDAW
with Interaction

Modell

- - - - _. .

.~----

Controls
Polity

Conflict

- - -

Con/rols
Polity

0.0041
(0.0127)

0.5727***
GDP Per Capita (natural log)

(OOX6X)
Population (natural log)

-

Modell

-0.0029
(00123)

GOP Per Capita (natural log)

_.

0.0367
(0.OSI>2)
0.0114

Population (natural log)

0.04X4
(0.05X7)

Conflict

0.0696
(04623)

(0452X)
International Actors
UN/World Bank Years (natural log)

International Actors
UN/World Bank Years (natural log)

0.1105
(0.1366)

Trade Ratio (natural log)

-0.0237
0.OS33

-0.0294
(0.1442)

INC;Os (natural log)

0.1019
(0.OSI4)

(O.06R2)
Local Actors
Women's Political Participation

Local Actors
Women's Political Participation

0.0022
(0.006X)

Dissonance
Muslim. Hindu. Buddhist Majorities

Dissonance
Muslim. lIindu. Buddhist Majorities

0.5197***
(OI64R)

Number a/Observations

Interaction Terms
Dissonance by UN/World Bank Years

137

Ad}llsted_R_'_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.5076
:-.Jotc: Standard errors in parentheses
*p<o.!: **p ...'O.05: ***p<O.O I

0.0061
(0.1492)

Trade Ratio (natural log)

(0.1251 )
INGOs (natural log)

0.5709*"
(0.OS74)

0.0006
(0.0072)
0.2096
(0.996X)
-O.OOSS'
(0.0052)

Dissonance by Trade Ratio

0.1341
(0 1975)

Dissonance by INGOs

·0.0345
(0.1600)

Dissonance by Women's Political
Paricipatinn

0.0066
(0.0247)

Numher of Obscr\'{lfiol1S

Ad;lIsted R'

137

0507
---------

Note: Standard ("rror~ 111 parentheses
0.1; **p<O.05: "'**p',O.01

"'p~

measured by the natural log of GOP per capita, and the dummy variable for dissonant states
were the two statistically significant variables affecting CEOAW's implementation. These
results show that a state's development level and local norms were the two greatest predictors
of how effectively that statc will implement CEOAW and cxplain nearly 51 percent of the
variance in implementation of CEOAW. The coefficients of each variable were substantively
significant as well. For example, the difference in implementation level between dissonant
states and congruent states was 0.52 points on the 0-4 scale of implementation; in other words.
implemcntation levels of dissonant statcs are about 10 percent lowcr than congruent states.
Although this percentage may be considered low, I conclude that is significant because of the
difficulty in predicting implementation of human rights treaties.
In terms of my second hypothesis, there should be a difference in the significance levels
of the international and local actor variables if local actors are more influential in dissonant
80

RAY

Economic Development v. Implementation of CEDAW

•

•

•

•

•••

•
•

• •• ••
••
•••
• •• ••• • • •
•

..-

• • •
•

•

- ••• ••

••

• • ••
••
•• •

6

7

I.

8
9
Nalural Log of GOP Per Capita
LAW

10

11

- - - Fitted values

Figure I: Economic Development and Implementation of CEDAW

states than in congruent states. I tested for this difference by creating interaction terms that
modeled each of the international actor variables with the dissonance dummy variable. Ifany of
these interaction terms prove to be significant, then there is a difference between that variable's
effect on implementation in dissonant and congruent states. The results of this test show that
the interaction term between UN/World Bank Years and dissonance is statistically significant,
meaning that the effect of a state's total years of membership in the UN and the World Bank
is stronger in dissonant states than in congruent states (See Table 3). The coefficient is also
negative, meaning that membership years more negatively affect implementation in dissonant
states than in congruent states, which supports my hypothesis that international actors are less
effective in dissonant states.
However, the difference is small and therefore not substantively significant. This result
could be due, however, to the validity of my measures. Because I had to adjust my measures to
solve the problem of missing data, my results may not accurately describe the true relationship
between CEDAW 's implementation and international and local actors. However, none of the
international factors showed a significant impact in dissonant states. In sum, I cannot conclude
that either local actors or international actors are more influential in dissonant states than in
congruent states with the available data.
Although the results from this study do not support my second hypothesis, they do
surprisingly show the overwhelming significance of economic development in women's rights
implementation. However, a scatter plot of the relationship between economic development
and CEDAW's implementation (Figure I) shows a potential problem with heteroskedasticity.
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In other words, the graph shows that economic development is a better predictor for highimplementation states than low-implementation states, which means that the coefficient I
found for the effect ofGDP per capita could be problematic. Heteroskedasticity also suggests
that there is another variable that is not accounted for in my model that would explain the
increased variation in implementation.
Conclusion
The sphere ofwomen's rights presents a unique challenge to improving the protection of
human rights throughout the world. The difficulty surrounding the implementation of women's
rights treaties and declarations may largely be attributed to the complexity. of reconstructing
international norms so that they fall in Iine with current local norms that perpetuate the derogatory
status of women in many societies. After completing a quantitative study of 151 countries, the
results support my first hypothesis that dissonant states are less likely to implement CEDAW
but do not support my hypothesis that local actors are more influential in dissonant states. The
results also show a stronger-than-expected relationship between economic development and
CEDAW's implementation. These results are statistically significant but must be interpreted
with the validity of the measures in mind. Even though not all of the variables measured what
I initially intended to measure, I can conclude that there is a significant difference between
dissonant states and congruent states in terms of CEDAW's implementation. This shows that
the two different types of states should be treated differently in efforts to improve the status of
women. Although this research does not show what factors should be focused on in dissonant
states to increase CEDAW's implementation, future research can strive for more valid measures
and incorporate additional explanations that would bring us closer to understanding how to
improve the lives of women.
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Inside the Death Star: Rational
Decision Making, Neoconservatism,
and the American Enterprise Institute
Tim Taylor

Abstract
This paper applies the rational decision-making model to the inception, rise, and influence
of the neoconservative foreign policy movement, as propounded by staff at the American
Enterprise Institute. The author analyzes the AEI s administration, staf]," and scholarship to show
how the AEf defined the u.s. foreign poliq and defense problem, generated a variety ofpossible
solutions, and selected the best solution-neoconservatism. Quantitative evidence shows that the
AEI's neoconservative viewpoint dominates neoliberal and realist viewpoints whenever the U.s.
contemplates war. The article describes how the AEI implemented the chosen decision as would
a typical think tank. Although most AEI scholars pushedfor the invasion o/fraq, now most have
criticized the execution of the war and have since distanced themselves from neoconservatism.
The paper concludes that the rational decision-making model appropriately applies to the AEI
in terms oj" the evaluation and modification stages oj" neoconservatism, but the model applies
poorly to actual implantation oj"public policy. This is partly due to the competition of ideas and
diversity oj"opinions at the institute.
Introduction
The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research is, at its heart, a refuge for
economists. Its founders christened the organization as the American Enterprise Association
and dedicated it to repealing the wartime economic regulations of the Roosevelt and Truman
administrations. Only much later did AEI expand into areas such as defense policy, cultural
studies, and political analysis. One distinctive word in its name-"Enterprise"-denotes an
economic focus, particularly the kind labeled as capitalistic, entrepreneurial, and risk tolerant.
The institute's economics-based history and etymology run concomitantly with its presidents.
All three have been economists by trade.
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Thus, given the affinity of AEI 's administration, staff, and scholarship for the quantifiable,
the practicable, and the utilitarian, I submit that the organization's behavior as a whole is best
modeled by the rational decision-making model, hereafter referred to as the rational model
(Robbins 1997; Frank 1995; Pounds 1969; March 1994). The model's systematic description
of group behavior fits well with the psychology of its managers: in all aspects of their work,
they layout a target, then work to reach it.
In particular, this paper examines how the rational model describes the inception, rise,
and influence of the neoconservative foreign policy movement as it has been propounded by
AEI staff and scholars. While "neocon" is a pejorative term in many academic and political
circles today, the movement of the same name has had a remarkable in"fluence on current
foreign policy. Its sudden and full-hearted adoption by the Bush administration is worth an
explanation and fair analysis.

The Rational Decision-Making Model
The rational decision-making model. once novel. has blossomed to the point that today
it alone may be considered a sub-discipline of organizational behavior (Klein 199R; HardyVallee 2007). The model has a massive body of scholarship girding it. Howevcr, at its center
are seven cssentially sacrosanct steps that organizations must follow to make rational dccisions
(Pounds 1969; Harrison 1995, 75-R5; Robbins and Judge 2007, 156-158). The steps are as
follows:
I. Definc the problem.
2. Generate all possible solutions.
3. Generate objective assessment criteria.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Choose the best solution.
Implement the chosen decision.
Evaluate the success of the chosen alternative.
Modify the decisions and actions taken based on evaluation.

While entire books have been written on each of these seven steps, their essencc is
simple. The sentences above should suffice for a basic understanding of the rational decisionmaking process.
Like any othcr rational choice-based model, the rational decision-making model requires
certain assumptions. These include the following: that decision makers can define objective
assessment criteria, that those criteria are measurable, that every potential solution to a
problem may be identified and properly evaluated, that decision makers have the prescience
to correctly identify the true consequences of different solutions, and that the outside world is
predictable. Only under these assumptions can the rational model work perfectly.
Given these limitations, most organizations use the more rcalistic, bounded rational
decision-making model (Zur 1997, 326-32R; Loizos 1994). The bounded model takes into
account the fact that decision makers arc unlikely to generate every possible solution to a
problem, and, thus, are unlikely to find the categorically perfect solution to a problem. The
bounded model also acknowledges that decision makers are imperfect in their ability to grasp
the complexity and the contingences of the problem at hand and that the environment with
which the problem interacts is predictable and rational. With these restrictions on perfect
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rationality in mind, then, the bounded model defines decision making as optimal when it is
"good enough." That is, the decision maker makes the best choice among available alternatives
when the search for more alternatives becomes more costly than continued inaction. A good
example of this phenomenon occurs in hospital emergency rooms. A doctor must choose
quickly among treatments for a critically injured patient, even if the available treatments'
efficacy is unknown, because the alternative is for the patient to worsen or die.
The rational model is widely applicable. For the purposes of this paper, it is applied to
the conception and rise of the neoconservative foreign policy movement. Using the simple
outline, the process may be described thus:
1. Define the problem: How does the U.S., first, conceptualize the post-Soviet world
order, and, second, promote its interests in that world order?
2. Generate all possible solutions: Should the U.S. pursue a policy based on realism
(Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979), neoliberalism (Nye 2004), civilizations theory
(Huntington 1996), neoconservatism (Fukuyama 1992; Kristol 1995), or something
else')
3. Generate objective assessment criteria: Which theory best keeps the U.S. safe, its
interests and allies safe, and allows the U.S. to further advance its interests?
4. Choose the best solution: "The policy of the United States [is) to seek and support the
growth of democratic movements ... with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our
world" (Office of the Press Secretary 2005).
5. Implement the chosen decision: Enforce regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq from
dictatorship to democracy, as advocated by AEI scholars.
6. Evaluate the success of the chosen alternative: A large body of scholarship from the
American Enterprise Institute discusses what has and has not worked in Iraq.
7. Modify the decisions and actions taken based on evaluation: The recalibration of both
neoconservative thought and AEl's relationship with it.

The Autobiography of an Idea
AEI prides itself as a place of ideas, and of the many debated there, chief among them
is what constitutes "vigilant and effective foreign and defense policies" (AEl 2007a). For the
purposes of this paper, this is the problem defined: What foreign and defense policy is most
vigilant and effective? While the neoconservative outlook is the institute's prevailing~though
not the only~answer to the question, that has not always been the case. A close examination
of AEI's deliberations from the 19805 until now demonstrates how the movement rose to
prominence among the many potential solutions to the problem of an effective foreign policy.
During the 1980s, there was no clear consensus at AEI as to which direction U.S. foreign
policy should take. AEI resident scholar Joshua Muravchik was one of the first at the institute
to promote the neoconservative viewpoint. His initial foray into the area, 1986's the Uncertain
Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy, rebuked Carter for his
administration's perceived selectivity in promoting human rights and condemning abuses.
His next work, however, was the ambitious Exporting Democracy (1991), which advocated
an idealistic foreign policy backed by the force of arms. While one review of the book
characterizes Muravchik's work as a framework for the post-Cold War world (Abbajay 1991),
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work on the book began much, much earlier. Over a week-long search for certain documents
in AEI's dusty basement archives (complete with oversized video cassettes from the 1970s),
I came across a box filled with Muravchik's notes, conference papers, and correspondence
from the 1980s. One common theme ran through them: democracy promotion is the key
to promoting U.S. interest, whether that promotion occurs in China, the Soviet Union. the
countries of Yugoslavia (all of which were prescient preoccupations for Muravchik, according
to the contents of the box), or anywhere else. Muravchik conceived his ideas far earlier than
we might otherwise suspect.
A different strain of foreign policy thinking came from AEI's Jeane Kirkpatrick. She joined
the institute in 1985, after finishing four years as U.S. ambassador to the UN. She described her
own vein ofthinking in the United States and the World: Setting Limits (1986). The book argued,
as the title suggests, that the U.S. must curtail its expectations for democracy in other nations and
make due with its ideologically imperfect allies and potential allies. The "Kirkpatrick Doctrine."
as this vein of thought became known, advocated alliances with any nation, whether democratic
or dictatorial, so long as it was anti-Communist.
Finally, a realist strand of deliberation came from, surprisingly, Richard Perle. His first
work for AEI, Reshaping Western Security (1991), contained scveral scholars' views on a
framework for a post-Cold War Europe. Perle, the book's editor and most prominent essayist.
argued that Western nations needed to orient their alliances and policies toward the Middle East
to ensure the region remained stable and that NATO did not collapse. Perle's book and earlier
work within the Reagan administration advocated the importance of stability, geopolitical
positioning, and other realist themes.
We may view thesc competing theories of foreign policy thought as step two of the
rational decision-making model: generating all possible solutions. While AEI probably rejected
neoliberal ideas prima facie, there was vigorous debate within the institute among the ideas
that were suggested. Through the debate, which benefited tremendously from the hindsight of
the Cold War and was shaped by the events of Bosnia and Somalia, a set of evaluation criteria
emerged: what foreign policy best ensures the security of the U.S. and the promotion of its
interests abroad, in the long term'? As Vaclav Havel penned for AEL "The real threats today
are those such as local conflicts fueled by aggressive nationalism, terrorism, and the potential
misuse of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction" (1997). This was the reality of
the post-Soviet world, and U.S. foreign policy had to meet its challenges.
In this battle of ideas, neoconservatism came out on top. Using an index of AEI's
publications, I coded the institute's scholarly output on foreign policy, and the results show in
part how this occurred. This coding is admittedly less rigorous than I would have liked, but
it does adhere to certain principles. First, I included only those articles that discussed foreign
policy in relation to what the U.S. should or should not do (or should not have done). Second,
I excluded articles discussing foreign policy as it relates to trade, finance, or technology with
no interrogation of the political ramifications. Third, I categorized each article as primarily
neoconservative, realist, or neoliberal in its outlook. True, only about half of the articles fit
tidily into one school of thought over another. For the more difficult cases, I simply did my
best to identify themes distinctive to each category. For neoconservatism, this included the
promotion of democratization, human rights, and the embrace of American exceptionalism.
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For realism, this included geopolitics, mistrust of international institutions, the balance of
power, and similar concepts. For neoliberalism, this included diplomacy, culture, sanctions,
and other kinds of soft power.
The results of this investigation are shown below:
Table 1: Foreign Policy Ideologies of AEI Publications

Year

Neoconservative

Realist

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007-

6

4

2

3

3

3

7
8
4
5
5
10
10
7
6
2

Neoliberal

2
2
4
0

7
2
2
3
I

4

2
3
7
2

2
3

I

Here are the same results in figure form :
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The data demonstrates one fact: whenever the U.S. contemplates war, the neoconservative
viewpoint becomes dominant. There are three spikes of neoconservative activity on the graph:
1998, 200 I, and 2003-2004. Not coincidentally (since most of the articles addressed the
subject), each of these years had significant debate about the use of U.S . force abroad. In 1998,
this was Kosovo; in 200 I , Afghanistan; and in 2003- 2004, Iraq. While many of the articles
over this time period discuss other trouble spots for U.S. security, such as China, North Korea,
Iran, and the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, most focus on the pressing conflict of the time.
Viewing these results through rational decision-making theory, we can safely say that, at
least during times of war, neoconservatism has been AEI's proposed solution to the problem
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of U.S. security. This is especially true regarding the Iraq war. If we remove the neoliberal
"noise" from the data (most of the neoliberal scholarship has revolved around diplomacy and
trade with China and North Korea), we easily see the strength of neoconservatism at AEI:
Figure 2. Ideological Balance at AEI
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AEI 's Irving Kristol confirmed this dominance of neoconservatism not only at the
institute, but in the Bush administration as well, when he stated:
By one of those accidents historians ponder, our current president and his administration
turn out to be quite at home in this new political environment, although it is clear
they did not anticipate this role any more than their party as a whole did. As a result,
neoconservatism began enjoying a second life (2003).
Even so, the rational model's step of generating alternatives does not perfectly describe
AEI's deliberations. This is so, first, because AEI's scholars were not conscious collaborators
on the problem of effective defense policy. We can assume the scholars critiqued each others '
work, but this is different from the intentionally cooperative, additive approach of the rational
model. Second, in the rational model, once the best alternative is identified, it is pursued
exclusively. AEI takes no official positions, and while the neoconservative school of thought
has dominated the institute at times, it has never gone unchallenged.
The rational model does, however, provide a good framework for understanding how
AEI's work has been translated into policy. Thus we may ask, how much influence have AEI's
ideas had on the current administration, and how have those ideas transferred from the twelfth
floor of 1150 17th Street to the West Wing and the State Department?
The Dark Side of the Force?
A portion of the blogosphere refers to the American Enterprise Institute as the "death
star" (e.g. , Encho 2007), but AEI's actual influence on public policy is far from all·powerful.
Columnist David Brooks best described the reality of the relationship between the "neocon
cabal" and government when he stated:
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In truth, the people labeled neocons (con is short for "conservative" and neo is short for
"'Jewish") travel in widely different circles and don't actually have much contact with one
another. The ones outside government have almost no contact with President Bush. There
have been hundreds of references, for example, to Richard Perle's insidious power over
administration policy, but I've been told by senior administration officials that he has had
no significant meetings with Bush or Cheney since they assumed office. If he's shaping
their decisions, he must be microwaving his ideas into their fillings (2004, 23A).
I did see General Peter Pace, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, at lunch with AEI's Fred
Kagan, but that was the extent of direct communication between government and think tank
that I observed.
The much sleepier reality is that AEI executes step five of the rational decisionmaking model, "'implementing the chosen decision," using the typical think tank tools of
literature, speaking engagements, and conferences. The institute has used all three to promote
neoconservative foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, and has done so particularly
since September II.

Literature
AEI disseminates its work several ways: through books and op-eds, articles for
newspapers, magazines and journals, in-house through its "On the Issues" and "Outlook"
publications series, the American magazine, and the AEI web site.
Books
The books shape public policy in two ways. First, they influence public opinion because
the public reads them. Second, and possibly more importantly, the books shape opinion
leaders' opinions. Early in my AEI internship, I spent a few afternoons stuffing hundreds of
copies of AEl's latest books into previously labeled envelopes. Each envelope was addressed
to a key opinion maker: Jospeh Biden, U.S. Senate; Bill O'Reilly, Fox News; James F. Hoge,
Foreign Affairs; and so on. AEI mails and e-mails its smaller publications to the subscribing
public, but also to a "highly customized lists ... of policy specialists and professionals" (AEI
2007b). As demonstrated earlier, these publications often took on a neoconservative slant from
the late 1990s until 2006.
Speaking Engagements
AEI scholars frequently promote their views through speeches, typically given at
universities, at sponsored lecture series and forums, and at professional group meetings. The
six international relations scholars who have been at the institute continuously from the year
2000 until the present (Thomas Donnelly, Joshua Muravchik, Reuel Mar Gerecht, Michael
Ledeen, Richard Perle, and Michael Rubin), have given ten speeches and testified before
Congress eleven times. Using the same coding instrument as earlier, I found that the policy
recommendations of those speaking engagements were nco liberal twice, realist five times,
and neoconservative fourteen times (see appendix A). Most notably, each speech advocated
a regime change in Iraq, Iran, or both, or after March 2003, the continued presence of U.S.
troops in Iraq.
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Conferences
Since the year 2000, AEI has sponsored 1,549 conferences. Of those, 509 have been
devoted to foreign and defense policy, 601 to economics, and 439 to social and domestic
policy studies CAEI 2007). However, the amount of attention devoted to each area of study has
changed from year to year, as demonstrated here:

Figure 2. AEI Conferences
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While the number of total conferences held has consistently risen since 200 1, they have
risen most quickly in the foreign and defense policy, with the category overtaking economics
and domestic policy in 2005. The rise offoreign and defense policy atAEI conferences is more
easily seen when we present the numbers of conferences relative to each other:
Figure 3. AEI Conferences by Percentege
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AEI has consistently devoted more of its resources to foreign and defense studies over
time at the expcnse of both its economic and domestic studies programs. It is a surprising tum,
given the organization's cconomic raison d'etrc.
On this subject, rational dccision making is a useful model, in so much as it is
accommodatcd to the realities of think tanks. Unlike a business or executive department, a
think tank cannot simply implement a new idea from beginning to end. Rather, it can only
persuade-but, oh, how persuasivc AEI has been! Its scholars and administration participate
in the policy formation process through disseminating information effectively, which is as
much as may be expccted from a think tank in the rational model.

Evaluation and Readjustment
While AEI's scholars almost unanimously pushed for the invasion of Iraq, some as
far back as 1997 (Muravchik 1997), and this push was dominated by the neoconservative
viewpoint, the aftermath of the war has seen something different. Continuing with the
rational decision-making model, its final steps are the evaluation of the chosen alternative
and consequent modifications to it. In terms of evaluation of the Iraq war, it has not gone
well. Nearly every article AEI scholars pen on the subject begins with a concessionary "Iraq
is a mess." AEI's scholars have also been extremely critical of the Bush administration's
execution of the war.
In terms of modification, two measures are worth noting. First, as shown earlier in this
paper, AEI is beginning to distance itself from neoconservatism. From a high of about 75
percent of defense studies scholarship in 2003, neoconservative work makes up less than
half of AEI's defense studies output today. Second, AEI's neoconservatives are distancing
themselves from the unpopular Bush administration. Muravchik, for example, wrote an op-ed
for the Washington Post in the aftermath of the 2006 election, which stated:
Is neoconservatism dead? Far from it. ... It is the war in Iraq that has made "neocon" a
dirty word, either because Bush's team woefully mismanaged the war or because the war
(which neocons supported) was misconceived (2006, B03).
Richard Perle summed the current thinking of neoconservatives when he stated:
Huge mistakes were made, and I want to be very clear on this: They were not made by
neoconservatives, who had almost no voice in what happened, and certainly almost no
voice in what happened after the downfall of the regime in Baghdad. I'm getting damn
tired of being described as an architect of the war (Rose 2006,3).
The future will tell what direction AEI will take regarding its defense policies. If eurrent
trends continue, however, the neoconservative experiment may be over. While not affiliated
with AEI, Kenneth Adelman suggested as much when he said that neoconservative ideas, after
Iraq, are "not going to sell ... you just have to put them in the drawer marked CAN'T DO"
(Rose 2006, 2).
Here, rational decision theory stumbles. Unlike a unitary organization that corrects
its course with one rudder, AEI is similar to a dozen little ships-each with an extremely
opinionated captain. Thus, while most of the institute's scholars acknowledge things have
gone poorly in Iraq, the reasons why and the remedies for them are diverse and sometimes
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contradictory. Just as there is no one simple solution to the problems of current U.S. foreign
policy, there is no one correction advocated by AEI.

Critiquing Rational Theory and the "Advocacy Tanks"
Is the rational choice decision-making theory the best way to describe AEl's behavior as
an organization') Probably not. I sincerely doubt that AEI's administrators ever layout policy
alternatives and perform cost-benefit analysis so clinically as a business' executives would. I
believe they do evaluate stringently the areas more germane to their role as administrators, such
as fund-raising, personnel recruitment, and marketing, but they are somewhat disinterested
(though not uninterested) in the actual content of their scholars' work.
I base this assertion on two facts. First, my own internship at AEI and my discussions
with the scholars there show me this is the case. I was never constrained in my research to
find the "right" answer to a question. While my work was often vetted for quality, it was never
subject to an ideological litmus test. The same is true of the scholars there, many of whom
have told me they enjoy the hands-off environment at AEI. When I asked one employee about
the organization's hierarchical structure, she laughed, saying, "WelL there's everyone who
works here, and maybe, I guess, Newt [Gingrich] about a halflayer up" (anonymous, personal
interview, 2007). Second, AEI prides itself as being an old-guard, "university-withoutstudents"-model think tank. Brookings is another example of this kind of think tank. The work
of these policy institutes is typically organic and inductive, without the predefined solution to
a problem yet to emerge, as is the case with advocacy model think tanks such as the Heritage
Foundation (the solution is conservatism), the Cato Institute (the solution is less government),
or the Center for American Progress (the solution is more government). Thus, AEI is adept
at presenting many alternative solutions but lacks the ability to execute anyone of them so
cleanly as the rational decision-making model would suggest.
The one part of the model that does dovetail nicely with AEI as an organization is in
the evaluation and modification stages. Administratively, AEI's managers cannot constrain
their scholars to produce research in a certain direction. I view the relationship between
the two as similar to that of presidents and Supreme Court nominations: a scholar's past
record is reviewed, he or she is appointed based on that record, and the managers hope the
scholar continues in that same vein. But, like the Suprcme Court, sometimes the appointers
get a Clarence Thomas, and sometimes they get a David Souter. Nonetheless, the manager's
influence is important.
AEl's university-style model also lends itself well on this point. Unlike the advocacy
tanks, whose solutions are fixed in stone, the AEI scholars may change their viewpoints
or admit they were flat-out wrong. Further, the institute encourages a competition of ideas
within its walls, and debate serves as an excellent tool for frank evaluation and as pressure
for adaptation-a pressure that is missing from the advocacy tanks. The diversity of opinions
means a less cohesive message from the institution as a whole, true, but at least it guarantees
many messages that have seen critical examination.
The rational decision-making model, again, is not a perfect, or even a good, descriptor of
AEl's behavior. Despite the conspiracy theories of many leftists, it is extremely doubtful that
the institute's scholars gathered in a basement on II September 200 I to decide how to best
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convince government to take out Saddam Hussein. Instead, it is likely that the neoconservative
outlook grew gradually and organically, both at AEI and elsewhere. While we may safely
assume that AEI's administrators rationally determine the avenues for growing their
organization's coffers and influence, it is doubtful they try to push policy in anyone direction
so forcefully as the rational decision-making model suggests.
APPENDIX A: Speaking Engagements of AEI Defense Scholars
Name
_ _ 0

Speeches

Testimony

0

0
3
0
2

_ _ _ _ 00

Joshua Muravchik
Thomas Donnelly
Reuel Mar Gerecht

0
2

Michael Ledeen
Richard Perle
Michael Ruben

6
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